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INTRODUCTION
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the
following: This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to
Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution.”1
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the
following: The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act is
constitutionally authorized under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause
supports the expansion of congressional authority beyond the explicit
authorities that are directly discernible from the text. Additionally, the
Preamble to the Constitution provides support of the authority to enact
legislation to promote the General Welfare.”2
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the
following: . . . Congress is within its constitutionally prescribed role to
direct the Environmental Protection Agency, a body which regulates
interstate commerce under the auspices of Congress, to appoint a
member of the Science Advisory Board based on the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture.”3
Statements like the ones quoted here are suddenly flowing through
Congress at the rate of several hundred per month. For the first time in
history, members of the House of Representatives who introduce a bill
must provide a statement explaining which clause of the Constitution
gives Congress the authority to enact that bill into law. Constitutional
authority statements (CASs) offer a window into how members of

1. 157 Cong. Rec. H1525 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
for H.R. 877 introduced by Representative Clay).
2. 157 Cong. Rec. H1666 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
for H.R. 988 introduced by Representative Schiff).
3. 157 Cong. Rec. H1843 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
for H.R. 1104 introduced by Representative Stutzman).
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Congress think about the Constitution—which often differs starkly from
the judiciary‘s approach.
Constitutional authority statements are the result of a rule change in
the 112th House of Representatives. When each two-year session of
Congress opens, the House re-adopts, with some changes, the rules
governing its internal operations. At the opening of the 112th Congress
in January 2011, the House of Representatives created a new rule
requiring each bill or resolution introduced in the House to include a
constitutional authority statement.4 This statement must identify ―the
power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the
bill or joint resolution.‖5 The CAS does not go into the text of the bill,
but is included in the Congressional Record, published on the Library of
Congress‘s THOMAS bill-tracking system, and printed on a cover sheet
when the bill is distributed to Representatives. The Senate does not have
a similar rule, but when a bill or joint resolution that was first passed in
the Senate is brought to the House, the chair of the House committee
with jurisdiction over the bill or resolution may introduce a CAS for the
bill.6
This is the first time in our nation‘s history that either house of
Congress has required formal statements of constitutional authority for
every bill its members introduce.7 The rule was somewhat controversial,
not for its content, but because of the partisan motivation driving its
adoption.8 The content is decidedly benign. The partisan zeal for
4. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress,
including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. During the 105th through 111th Congresses (1997–2010), the House of
Representatives required that most committee reports must ―include a statement citing the
specific powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill
or joint resolution.‖ See H.R. Res. 5, Sec. 13, 105th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess., Jan. 7, 1997)
(adopting rules for the 105th Congress). The rule applied only to bills that were reported out of
committee, not to every bill that was introduced. The differences between the prior rule and the
current one are discussed more fully in Subsection V.A.1. The committee report CAS rule was
eliminated at the beginning of the 112th Congress. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011)
(adopting rules for the 112th Congress and striking the provision that previously required CASs
in committee reports); Adopting Rules for the 112th Congress, Section-by-Section Analysis,
H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011), http://rules.house.gov/Media/file/PDF/HRes%205%20Sec-bySec.pdf, at 1 (explaining that the new rule ―repeals the current requirement for a similar
[constitutional authority] statement in committee reports‖).
8. Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency from 2008–10. One
of the major complaints of the Republican opposition during this time was that the Democrats in
government were ignoring the Constitution. Not only were they enacting controversial
legislation that the Republicans claimed was unconstitutional, but they were brushing aside the
Republicans‘ constitutional arguments against the bills. A major incident was House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi‘s dismissive answer, ―Are you serious?‖ when asked about the constitutionality of
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adoption should not blind us to the potential long-term benefits of the
measure.9 Congress has certain powers under the Constitution, and in a
democratic society under the rule of law, government officials are
expected not to usurp power that has not been granted to them.10
Various mechanisms, from elections to legislative debate to judicial
review, help guarantee that government officials act within their proper
authority. Constitutional authority statements in Congress are a simple
and straightforward self-monitoring mechanism to add to this arsenal.
Had the rule been adopted early in America‘s constitutional history11
and survived to the present day, it would likely have been wholly
uncontroversial the entire time.12
CASs are so unobjectionable that the main argument against them is
that they will be useless. Opponents claim that the rule change was a
meaningless piece of political theater that would waste time and money
but change nothing.13 Legislators can pluck out any old clause of the
health care reform legislation. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the
Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 193, 234 (2011) (discussing Speaker Pelosi‘s statement
as an instigator and rallying cry of Tea Party organizers for constitutional discussion in
Congress). Republicans won control of the House partially on the promise to take the
Constitution seriously. See Republicans in Congress, A Pledge to America: A new governing
agenda built on the Priorities of Our Nation, the Principles We Stand for, & America‟s
Founding
Values,
http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-toamerica.pdf, at 33 (―We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause
citing the specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.‖). The CAS rule is
one implementation of that promise. See Delivering Reform to Congress, http://www.gop.gov/in
depth/pledge/reform (citing the changes to the House of Representatives rules as fulfilling the
election promise to ―Adhere to the Constitution‖).
9. See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the
Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 508 (2009) (―[G]ood-government reforms tend to be adopted
either after spectacular failures . . . or as packages offered by political movements that organize
support around a reasonably large reform agenda.‖).
10. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (noting that ―[t]he dangers of
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized‖).
11. Despite the lack of a rule requiring an explicit statement of constitutional authority,
early Congresses debated the constitutional authority for their actions regularly, as a ―threshold
question.‖ See David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 1789–1861, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 20 (Neal Devins & Keith E.
Whittington, eds., 2005).
12. An individual CAS may be controversial if it expresses a contested interpretation of
the Constitution, but the idea of requiring the CAS does not thereby become controversial. In
fact, differing interpretations of the Constitution reflected in CASs should lend additional
credence to the practice of requiring the statements, because they help members of Congress and
private citizens recognize and engage in important debates over the meaning of the Constitution.
13. See, e.g., Pete Kasperowicz, Democrat: Citing Constitution Will Cost Taxpayers
$570K, THE HILL‘S FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Jan. 10, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/floor-action/house/136995-democrat-citing-constitutional-authority-in-bills-will-cost-you
(reporting objections that the bill will waste money on administrative costs); Jackie Kucinich,
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Constitution to attach to their dubiously constitutional bills, and trust
that nobody will call them on it because politics and policy always
trump constitutional objections.14
I disagree with this assessment. Constitutional authority statements
alone may not change anything. I argue, however, that they are a useful
tool for increasing Congress‘s deliberations about the Constitution.
Constitutional authority statements perform three important
functions. First, they attempt to answer a fundamental question that
should be asked about all legislation: whether Congress has the
authority to enact a law on the subject. Second, they can trigger further
discussions about constitutionality within Congress, which could help
legislators make more robust and considered decisions. Third, they
provide a window for judges, scholars, and others into what
Representatives think about the Constitution.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I discusses Congress‘s
authority and institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution. Part II
situates constitutional authority statements within existing debates over
constitutional interpretation outside the courts. Congress must
necessarily make decisions about constitutional meaning when it
legislates. Most scholars believe Congress has at least some
independent authority to interpret the Constitution, while others think
Congress should follow Supreme Court doctrine even when Congress
disagrees.15 Regardless of which theory is correct, Congress needs to
consider constitutionality (however defined) when legislating. CASs
increase Congress‘s capacity to do so by creating an institutional
mechanism that prioritizes constitutional analysis.
Part III examines issues involving the substantive content of
constitutional authority statements. The rule requires ―specific‖
statements, but does not define ―specific.‖16 Nor is it clear how a
Representative can cite authority that flows from the structure of the
Constitution rather than from a textual provision. Additionally, this
section examines enforcement of the rule to ensure that members follow
its requirements.
Part IV turns to the question of judicial review. Now that
Congress—at least, a portion of Congress—takes an official position
GOP Educating Members About New Constitutionality Rule, ROLL CALL (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201826-1.html (reporting objections that the new rule
―deal[s] with a problem that doesn‘t really exist‖); Ben Weyl, Parties Spar Over Interpretation
of „Constitutional Authority‟ Rule, CQ TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011), 2011 WLNR 3393485.
14. See, e.g., Kasperowicz, supra note 13 (reporting objection that the statements will be
largely ignored).
15. See infra notes 16 and 42 and accompanying text.
16. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess. 2011).
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about the constitutional basis of every single law it enacts, how should
the courts treat this information? Should the courts give some amount of
deference to Congress‘s constitutional statements? More importantly,
should courts consider only Congress‘s cited constitutional authority, or
may courts find an independent justification for upholding a law
regardless of what the CAS has cited? This Article argues that CASs are
a very weak form of legislative history, are for the most part not written
with judicial interpretation in mind, and are therefore not particularly
useful to courts. Judges should not, and probably will not, strike down
statutes because of a CASs mistaken constitutional interpretations.
Part V examines several ways that Congress can, if it desires,
strengthen the CAS requirement. Some of these reforms are aimed at
making CASs better at what they currently do: enhancing congressional
deliberation. Others attempt to make CASs into more authoritative
statements that could be used in court interpretations. Both the House of
Representatives and the Senate should evaluate the costs and benefits of
a variety of ways of implementing a CAS rule.
Throughout this Article, I make various empirical statements about
the actual constitutional authority statements that Representatives have
written. These claims are drawn from a complete list of all the CASs for
bills introduced from January through April 2011, the first four months
that the rule was in effect, which I compiled and categorized. The
database contains 1,653 bills and 56 joint resolutions. In some ways,
this may be an unrepresentative sample. Compliance with the rule might
be more zealous when it is first adopted, then fall off later. Or the other
way around—compliance might improve as Representatives and their
staffs become more familiar with constitutional analysis. Additionally,
party leaders often choose to introduce the most important bills on their
legislative agendas at the beginning of the session, and those bills might
have different CAS attributes than more ordinary legislation (or more
rushed legislation) introduced later. I gathered this data to provide
preliminary information about what is happening, and I do not intend to
make any strong claims about what CASs will universally look like.
The goal of the present Article is not to reach empirical conclusions, but
to explore theoretical questions with some real-world illustrations.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN CONGRESS
Fundamentally, a constitutional authority statement is a
congressional interpretation of the Constitution. To determine which
part of the Constitution authorizes a bill, the author of the statement
must reach some opinions about what the Constitution means. A
preliminary question about the CAS rule, then, is whether Congress has
the authority to interpret the Constitution at all. Further, does Congress
have the capacity to interpret the Constitution correctly? This Part
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summarizes the scholarly literature, which mainly argues that
constitutional interpretation in Congress is important, but suggests a
variety of reasons to justify it. This Part then argues that whatever the
outermost limits of Congress‘s interpretive capacity are, writing
constitutional authority statements is certainly within those limits. More
importantly, the rule requiring sponsors to write CASs is itself an
institution that enhances Congress‘s ability to interpret the Constitution.
A. Congress‟s Authority to Interpret the Constitution
1. Theories of Constitutional Interpretation in Congress
Most scholars believe that the Supreme Court is not the sole
authorized interpreter of the Constitution.17 A variety of theories claim,
for different reasons and to different extents, that people other than
judges have some responsibility for constitutional interpretation.
Determining the correctness of these theories is far beyond the scope of
this Article. A brief description of some of these theories—popular
constitutionalism, departmentalism, and theories about the political
question doctrine, the presumption of constitutionality, and the oath of
office—shows that a wide range of people should be interested in
constitutional authority statements from Congress.
Popular Constitutionalism is a broad and somewhat difficult to
define18 family of theories.19 It argues, most basically, that
constitutional interpretation should not rest solely in the hands of a
judicial elite.20 Popular constitutionalists believe that the Constitution
should be interpreted in some way by the citizens themselves,21 or by

17. This scholarly consensus is relatively recent. In 1966, scholars recognized a consensus
on the opposite theory, judicial supremacy. See, e.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 13 (1966).
18. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1594, 1602, 1628 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (questioning whether the concept of
―popular constitutionalism‖ can be defined in a noncontradictory way at all)); David E. Pozen,
Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053 (2010) (―It
can be difficult to get a firm grip on what people mean by ‗popular constitutionalism.‘‖).
19. For complete expositions of various theories of popular constitutionalism, see
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6–32 (1999).
20. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 6–32 (1999); Alexander & Solum, supra note 18,
at 1608 (characterizing Professor Kramer‘s theory loosely as ―the people themselves have an
enemy, and that enemy is ‗judicial supremacy‘‖); Pozen, supra note 18, at 2055–56.
21. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 18, at 2057–58.
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institutions that are closer and more responsive to citizens than
appointed federal judges are.22
Congress‘s constitutional authority statements should interest
popular constitutionalists because the legislature is a more
representative institution than the judiciary.23 Constitutional
interpretation in Congress still differs significantly from interpretation
by the people themselves, so some popular constitutionalists may view
CASs as yet another elitist institution that removes power from the
people. Others, however, will see more robust congressional attention to
the Constitution as a step in the right direction, bringing the
Constitution to a more democratically responsive institution than the
federal judiciary.24 Popular constitutionalists will be interested to
investigate whether Congress‘s statements about the Constitution more
closely track popular understanding than the Supreme Court‘s
statements.
Departmentalism25 is somewhat related to popular constitutionalism,
in that it argues strongly for interpretive authority outside the courts.26
However, instead of placing authority in the public, departmentalism
places authority in all three branches of the federal government.27 The
allocation of interpretive authority among the branches might be equal
or unequal. Each branch might have its own independent sphere of
authority, or the branches might overlap and contest authority with each
other.28
22. See generally Pozen, supra note 18 (advocating judicial elections as an institution for
implementing popular constitutionalism).
23. See MORGAN, supra note 17, at 29 (citing Congress‘s representative nature as one
reason it should be good at handling constitutional questions). See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9 (1980) (discussing the problem
that unelected judges pose to democratic theory).
24. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (noting a possible criticism of judicial
supremacy as ―undermin[ing] the authority of the people‘s representatives to determine the
content of the Constitution‖). See generally TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 17 (treating
congressional constitutional interpretation as a form of popular constitutionalism).
25. For major works on the theory of departmentalism, see generally MORGAN, supra note
17, at 346; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270–72 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 219–27 (1994).
26. See Post & Siegel, supra note 24, at 1031–32 (noting that popular constitutionalism
and judicial supremacy both advocate removing some of the Supreme Court‘s power to be the
binding interpreter of the Constitution).
27. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 18, at 1609–10 (―The basic premise of
departmentalism is that interpretive authority is shared by the three branches of government.‖).
See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 2004).
28. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 18, at 1609–15 (describing several
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Departmentalists focus heavily, though not entirely, on constitutional
interpretation and decision making in the executive branch. This may be
in part because the Executive Branch produces reasonably wellorganized and accessible published statements about the Constitution
(though not as organized, accessible, and thorough as the Supreme
Court Reporter). The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice produces numerous analyses of constitutional issues, many of
which are published either immediately or after a delay, allowing
scholars to analyze these opinions easily.29 Administrative agencies also
publish constitutional analysis in rules and adjudications. Congressional
materials are not nearly as well-organized or accessible as Executive
Branch ones, and where Congressional materials are available, lawyers
and scholars are often simply unaware that they exist.
Constitutional authority statements in Congress should obviously
interest advocates of departmentalism. The balance in constitutional
interpretation has shifted heavily toward the courts over the past two
hundred years.30 Any assertion of interpretive responsibility by
Congress helps move the balance back in the departmentalist direction.
Departmentalists will be interested in the specific details of how
Congress should implement CASs, how CASs are used in further debate
within Congress, and how the Executive Branch and courts treat
Congress‘s statements.
The Political Question Doctrine31 provides another reason to pay
attention to Congress‘s interpretations of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has held that many questions of constitutional interpretation are
textually committed to another branch of government and cannot be
answered by the courts.32 Congress thus frequently deals with issues
departmentalist theories); Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1112–13 (2011) (arguing that ―there is (sometimes) affirmative
value in promoting the means for interbranch tension and conflict without any sort of superior
body that can articulate a global, principled, final, and binding decision on the matter‖).
29. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (analyzing published OLC opinions).
30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958) (declaring that the Supreme
Court‘s interpretations of the Constitution are binding on Congress).
31. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 330 (2002)
(stating the importance of the political question doctrine).
32. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 707, 725–27 (1985); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (―Consider the large domain of
constitutional decisionmaking over which the Supreme Court has essentially ceded control to
the political branches by articulating deferential standards of review, limits on standing and
justiciability, and the political-question doctrine. Impeachments and many issues involving
electoral processes generally lie within this domain, and other questions do as well.‖); id. at
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over which the courts have no jurisdiction.33 These questions include
impeachment,34 appointments, the accuracy of enrolled bills,35 and
expulsion or exclusion of the legislature‘s members.
On some of these questions, Congress is the final and only
interpreter of the Constitution. On others, Congress shares interpretive
authority with the President. Formal statements about Congress‘s
understanding of the Constitution on these subjects, then, are most
welcome. Statements that are intended to spark further debate if
controversial are even more welcome.
The Presumption of Constitutionality doctrine tells judges that they
should assume that Congress is complying with the Constitution.36 The
presumption of constitutionality is the doctrine that courts should ―defer
to or presume the correctness of the judgment of the legislative branch
that a statute it enacts is constitutional.‖37 The presumption can, of
course, be overcome in court, but courts will go out of their way to look
for a rational basis Congress might have relied on to justify the statute‘s
constitutionality. The act of passing the statute, alone, is seen as a
congressional statement that the statute is constitutional in Congress‘s
opinion.
The presumption of constitutionality applies regardless of the level
of discussion that took place in Congress. There may have been
extensive constitutional debate about a bill, or the debate may have
focused entirely on policy issues instead of constitutional ones, or the
bill may have been passed in a stealthy manner with no recorded
legislative history at all. The courts do not even look to legislative
history to decide whether to apply the presumption of constitutionality;
they simply apply it for every statute.38 As some scholars have pointed
1284–85 (listing constitutional questions the Supreme Court has declined to answer).
33. See MORGAN, supra note 17, at 11.
34. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993) (discussing the Senate‘s
unreviewable power to create procedures for impeachment trials).
35. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892) (holding that a bill
signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate must be accepted by the
courts as having passed both houses, regardless of evidence to the contrary).
36. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 151–52 (2004) (arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is inconsistent with
the original meaning of the Constitution and advocating that it be replaced with a presumption
of liberty). See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447 (claiming that deference to legislatures about constitutional
decisions makes more sense than deference to legislatures about facts); James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)
(arguing that the power to determine whether a law is constitutional belongs to the legislature,
not the judiciary).
37. BARNETT, supra note 36, at 151–52.
38. The level of discussion about a bill‘s constitutionality is not necessarily correlated
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out, this can lead to a cyclical deference, in which nobody actually
makes a decision about constitutionality: If Congress is avoiding the
question in the belief that the courts should answer the question, but the
courts then apply a presumption that Congress has already decided that
a statute is constitutional, then nobody ever does an independent
analysis.39
Constitutional authority statements can make Congress‘s
constitutional deliberations more frequent and more transparent.
Scholars concerned with the presumption of constitutionality should see
this as a welcome development, and should be interested to see whether
judges are more or less likely to accept Congress‘s explicit
justifications, as opposed to its implicit ones.
The Oath of Office provides another potential reason to believe that
constitutional authority statements in Congress are important. All
federal and state government officials are constitutionally required to
take an oath to support the Constitution.40 It is not simply a formality.41
with its constitutionality. Congress may choose not to discuss a bill‘s constitutionality because it
is so obviously constitutional that it does not merit debate time, or because it is so obviously
unconstitutional (but politically popular) that nobody dare bring it up, or because nobody cares
whether it is constitutional or not. Some Members of Congress may also hold the view that
decisions about constitutionality should be left to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra
note 17, at 3–10 (recounting evidence that a significant minority of Members of Congress think
constitutional questions should be considered only by the courts, not by Congress itself). This
view, combined with the presumption of constitutionality, could lead to a vicious cycle of
deference in which each branch was deferring to another and no branch ever made an
independent decision about constitutionality. See id. at 11 (―[I]t is hard to defend judicial
presumption [that acts of Congress are constitutional] unless Congress itself deals
conscientiously with constitutional questions.‖).
39. See Randy Barnett, Double Deference and the House GOP‟s Fair-Weather
Federalism, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 2011, 12:46 PM) http://www.volokh.com
/2011/05/22/double-deference-and-the-house-gops-fair-weather-federalism/ (―Thus does the
Court defer to Congress, while the House Republicans—just like Congressional Democrats—
defer to the Court‘s assessment of constitutionality.‖); Randy Barnett, Professor Jost Replies,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 19, 2009, 9:37 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/09/19/
professor-jost-replies (―[I]f the Supreme Court adopts a ‗presumption of constitutionality‘ by
which it defers to the Congress‘s judgment of the constitutionality of its actions . . . and the
Congress adopts [the] view that ‗unconstitutionality‘ means whatever the Supreme Court says,
then NO ONE EVER evaluates whether a act of Congress is or is not authorized by the
Constitution.‖); Randy Barnett, This Is What Courts Defer to?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April
3, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/03/this-is-what-courts-defer-to/ (noting
that the congressional ―judgment‖ courts defer to is often either a prediction of what the courts
are likely to do or a complete abdication of responsibility, not an independent decision); see also
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator‟s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 585, 599 (1975) (arguing that Congress should apply stricter constitutional tests on itself
because rational basis review implicitly delegates constitutional decision-making from courts to
Congress).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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Some legislators have spoken about the oath as a serious factor in their
decision making.42
Leaders in the House of Representatives themselves cited the oath of
office as a justification for adopting the CAS rule. In a memo explaining
the new rule to Members, the leadership stated, ―While the courts have
the power to overturn an Act of Congress on the basis that it is
unconstitutional, Members of Congress have a responsibility, as clearly
indicated by the oath of office each Members takes, to adhere to the
Constitution.‖43
Observers interested in the oath of office arguments should support
constitutional authority statements because CASs are a way of making
sure that legislators are not violating their oaths to uphold the
Constitution.
Finally, anyone who believes that Congress should not be
interpreting the Constitution in any authoritative way should be
interested in constitutional authority statements. This group is relatively
small, as most scholars think Congress has some interpretive
responsibility.44 Still, some highly respected scholars have come out in
favor of strong judicial supremacy.45 To people in this camp,
Congress‘s reassertion of its interpretive authority may be a sign of
danger. Judicial supremacists, like departmentalists, will be interested to
see how the courts treat these new constitutional authority statements.

41. See generally Louis Fisher, supra note 32, at 718–19; Steve Sheppard, What Oaths
Meant to the Founding Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273
(2009), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/SHEPPARD_2009_273.pdf.
42. See Sen. Russ Feingold, Upholding an Oath to the Constitution: A Legislator‟s
Responsibilities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (noting several instances of amending legislation to
make it constitutional as fulfillment of his oath of office).
43. COMM. ON RULES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, New Constitutional Authority
Requirement for Introduced Legislation (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.rules.house.gov/about/
PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsID=72 [hereinafter Rules Committee Memo].
44. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1306 (―Normatively, most mainstream
theories of constitutionalism deem congressional review for constitutionality to be an
affirmative good, regardless of the scope of subsequent judicial review.‖).
45. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy
and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2004); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring that ―the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution‖ and that federal and state legislators are bound to follow the Supreme Court‘s
interpretations); MORGAN, supra note 17, at 10 (laying out the principles of what he calls the
―judicial monopoly‖ theory, but not endorsing it); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its
Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 408 (2003) (arguing that critiques of judicial supremacy
―miss the mark‖ and that ―advocates for changing longstanding practices bear the burden of
persuasion for changing them‖).
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Before moving on, two things bear mentioning. First, this discussion
has raised several large questions that a single article cannot answer,
and the rest of this Article will continue to raise more questions. To
name a few: whether Congress‘s interpretations are consistent with the
Court‘s interpretations, whether Congress‘s interpretations are more
consistent with popular understanding than the Court‘s interpretations
are, whether CASs are discussed in Congress after they are written, how
the Executive Branch and courts will treat constitutional authority
statements,46 and whether CASs make Congress less likely to
accidentally or intentionally violate the Constitution. Constitutional
authority statements provide a huge field for further research. I hope
this Article can serve as a launching point for future discussions of these
and other issues.
Second, a note about party politics is in order. Since 2008,
Republicans have been loudly proclaiming that Congress, and the
people themselves, should take the Constitution more seriously.47 Some
(but not all) Democrats, in response, have been claiming that the
Constitution is the domain of the courts—that is, taking the judicial
supremacy position.48 This partisan alignment is a very recent
development, largely in response to political circumstances.49 And it is
almost certainly a transient phenomenon. If Republicans gain undivided
power again, constitutional arguments in Congress will come more
often from Democrats. A study undertaken in 1999–2000, an era when
the Constitution was less salient as a political issue, found no
relationship between party affiliation and a Congressperson‘s views of
congressional authority to interpret the Constitution.50

46. This Article answers some questions about judicial use of constitutional authority
statements in Part III, but the discussion is entirely theoretical because no court has discussed
the statements yet.
47. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 8, at 235–36; see Republicans in Congress, supra note
8, at 33 (―We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause citing the
specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.‖).
48. See, e.g., Kasperowicz, supra note 13 (―[Democratic Representative Corrine] Brown
reiterated other Democratic arguments against the [CAS] rule, including that it is the job of the
courts to decide when Congress has overstepped its bounds.‖).
49. During the passage of the health care reform legislation, Democrats had a majority in
the House of Representatives and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, making their
legislative agenda almost unstoppable.
50. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation,
in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 50–51 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington, eds.,
2005).
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2. Compliance (or Noncompliance) with Doctrine
A major question within this field is whether Congress should
comply with Supreme Court doctrine on constitutional questions, or
whether Congress should reach its own, independent decisions about
constitutional meaning. Regardless of which view is correct, CASs are a
helpful tool. They can be used to explore doctrine as well as to reach
independent conclusions—and in fact, Congress has already been using
them in both ways.
Even if Congress does assert independent authority in some
situations, most of the time Congress wants laws to comply with the
Supreme Court‘s understanding of the Constitution. Perhaps Congress
thinks the Court is doing an excellent job of developing the right to
equal protection, for instance, and wants to make sure that new laws
comply with all of the Supreme Court doctrine on the subject. Or
perhaps Congress fears it would lose an all-out battle with the Court on
a particular constitutional issue, does not want to impose the costs of
litigation on parties who would challenge the statute,51 or prefers to
maintain stability in the law rather than the uncertainty that would flow
from a disputed interpretation. In those cases, Congress might choose to
write a statute that accomplishes as much of its own agenda as possible
while not running afoul of Court doctrine.
Congress‘s relationship to doctrine can sometimes be more complex
than simply accepting or rejecting it. Take, for example, the issue of
protests at military funerals. The Supreme Court recently decided in
Snyder v. Phelps52 that the First Amendment protects the speech of
protesters at a military funeral when the protest complied with state law
regulating the time, place, and manner of the protest. The protesters
were therefore not liable to family members of the deceased for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.53 One proposed
congressional response to this decision was to reduce the likelihood that
emotional distress would occur without contradicting Supreme Court
doctrine on the subject.54 H.R. 961 proposes to increase the limits on
funeral protests without banning them outright, and its constitutional
authority statement summarizes the prevailing doctrine: ―The First
Amendment to the Constitution permits time, place and manner
restrictions on free speech.‖55 The sponsor of this bill clearly disagrees
51. See BAMBERGER, RECKLESS LEGISLATION 49–50 (2000) (discussing the disruptive
real-world effects of having a statute struck down); MORGAN, supra note 17, at 11 (stating that
―sole reliance on court determination may present difficulties‖).
52. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
53. See id. at 1215–19.
54. Safe Haven for Heroes Act of 2011, H.R. 961, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
55. 157 Cong. Rec. H1620 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
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with the outcome of Snyder—that protesters were allowed to gather
near a military funeral—but agrees with the general doctrine that led to
that result.56
The Constitution and what the Court says about the Constitution are
not the same thing, but people sometimes talk about them as if they
were.57 The requirement for a constitutional authority statement could
be interpreted to include reference to court cases that are relevant to the
issue being discussed. Several of the CASs in the database do in fact
cite to Supreme Court cases58 or mention court doctrine59 in addition to
citing provisions of the Constitution itself. Many (probably even most)
others are surely citing portions of the Constitution in ways that accord
with the Court‘s interpretation of those provisions, though they do not
cite the doctrine directly.
Interpreters of statutes routinely assume that Congress is not only
aware of the statutory background against which it legislates, 60 but also
for H.R. 961 introduced by Representative Ruppersberger).
56. See Md. Congressman Wants To Prevent Funeral Protests, WBAL TV, March 8,
2011, available at http://www.wbaltv.com/r/27118214/detail.html (―Ruppersberger‘s aides said
they think the Safe Haven for Heroes Act is constitutional because it does not directly challenge
the Supreme Court‘s free speech ruling.‖); Press Release, Ruppersberger Announces Legislation
To Prevent Protests During Military Funerals (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://dutch.house.gov/
2011/03/ruppersberger-announces-legislation-to-prevent-protests-during-military-funerals.shtml.
57. See generally BAMBERGER, supra note 51 (accusing legislators of ignoring ―the
Constitution,‖ by which he largely means Supreme Court doctrine).
58. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H1524 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 869 introduced by Representative Denham) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3; United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940)); 157 Cong. Rec.
H1525 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 873 introduced by
Representative Lewis) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I (―Article I of the United States
Constitution . . . further clarified and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.‖));
157 Cong. Rec. H1986 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R.
1152 introduced by Representative Rangel) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 and 14;
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)).
59. See 157 Cong. Rec. H2916 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 1644 introduced by Representative Rivera) (mentioning the ―Interstate
Travel Regulation‖ of the Commerce Clause). This probably refers to ―use of the channels of
interstate commerce,‖ which is the first category of the Supreme Court‘s doctrine regarding
three categories of commerce regulation. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
See also 157 Cong. Rec. H1620 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for
H.R. 961 introduced by Representative Ruppersberger) (―The First Amendment to the
Constitution permits time, place and manner restrictions on free speech.‖).
60. The in pari materia canon, which presumes that a legislature uses the same words
consistently throughout statutes on the same subject, is one example of this assumption in
statutory interpretation. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 39 (2012). Another is the canon against implied repeals,
which assumes that a legislature intended its new statute to fit with prior law on the subject if
possible, without asking whether the legislature even considered the prior statute. See id. § 55.
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is aware of judicial interpretations of prior law.61 Congress is assumed
to legislate in light of all of that existing legal background. Many
commentators have pointed out that these assumptions are clearly
false.62 The law is too big and too complicated for all of the effects of
new legislation to be understood ex ante. Yet the assumptions remain.
Constitutional authority statements can be thought of as a way of
making these assumptions more accurate in fact. Congress is attempting
to become aware of, and to comply with, a portion of the relevant
existing law before it enacts new legislation—the portion that involves
the Constitution and perhaps court interpretations of the Constitution.
When Congress does wish to challenge the Supreme Court‘s
interpretation of a constitutional provision, a CAS can help make that
challenge more explicit. A CAS might cite the contested provision of
the Constitution and state that Congress‘s interpretation differs from the
Court‘s. Or the differing interpretation might be only implied, but
would be revealed through comparison of the statute and its CAS with
existing doctrine.
The usefulness of CASs, then, does not depend on a belief that
Congress should interpret the Constitution independently. CASs can be
used either to comply with, to fight against, or to ignore Supreme Court
interpretations. We should expect to find a combination of these
approaches, as CASs are written by Representatives holding different
views.
B. Congress‟s Capacity to Interpret the Constitution
Scholars interested in Congress‘s authority to interpret the
Constitution often find themselves arguing over Congress‘s institutional
capacity to interpret the Constitution. If Congress is terrible at
constitutional interpretation, departmentalism and the political question
doctrine start to seem like really bad ideas. Not surprisingly, scholars
differ over how capable Congress is at doing robust constitutional
interpretation.
What does it mean to say that Congress does or does not have
sufficient capacity to interpret the constitution? Problems of capacity
can be divided into three categories. First, Congress might simply forget

61. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341, 375 (2010) (describing the ―reenactment rule‖ canon, which holds that a
legislative reenactment of a statute without changes incorporates prior judicial and
administrative interpretations of the statute).
62. See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) (―[M]ost Supreme Court opinions never come to the attention
of Congress.‖).
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to consider constitutional questions.63 If potential unconstitutionality is
frequently overlooked, Congress will rarely have the opportunity to
make constitutional decisions.
Second, Congress might lack the motivation to consider
constitutional questions, or to consider those questions honestly. With a
limited amount of time available for debate on each bill, members may
choose to focus their attention on policy considerations and political
maneuvering rather than questions of constitutionality.64 Alternatively,
members might make constitutional arguments only strategically to
further their political goals, not out of actual concern for
constitutionality.65
Third, members of Congress, their staffs, and support agencies may
not have enough knowledge or expertise to analyze constitutional issues
properly. Even if they make their best attempt to determine whether a
bill is constitutional or not, they may get the answer wrong more often
than not, or may simply be unable to reach a conclusion.
The exact limits of Congress‘s capacity to interpret the Constitution
are difficult to quantify. Congress certainly has some capacity to
analyze constitutional questions. Members can and do make
constitutional decisions when important issues come to their attention.
They take advantage of expert witnesses at hearings, their legally
trained staff, constitutional experts at the Congressional Research
Service, and other resources to help them make these decisions.66

63. See, e.g., Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1298 (discussing the ―fire-alarm
model‖ of constitutional monitoring, in which members of Congress do not consider
constitutional problems with a bill unless an outside interest group brings those problems to
their attention).
64. See BAMBERGER, supra note 51, at 66–69 (providing an example of how constitutional
considerations can take a back seat in debates over hot-button political issues); Garrett &
Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1300 (criticizing the ―fire alarm model‖ of constitutional analysis in
Congress); Mikva, supra note 62, at 587 (―For the most part, legislative debate does not explore
the constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job
of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.‖).
65. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 17, at 21–24 (describing the interrelatedness of policy
and constitutional questions and noting that ―[t]he dynamism of the struggle for policy with its
mood of urgency and immediacy makes the constitutional appeal seem at the least pointless, at
the worst sheer treason‖). But see Jeffrey K. Tulis, On Congress and Constitutional
Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2009) (―[A] separation of powers system [can] tie the
ambitions of officeholders to the duties of the office in such a manner as to produce impressive
arguments, however insincere or inauthentic. These arguments take on a life of their own, and
far from being merely the cover or rationalization for private interest and ambition (of ‗real‘
politics), they become the substance and action of politics itself.‖).
66. See generally Fisher, supra note 32, at 730.
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Further, changes to Congress‘s internal rules and institutional structures
can enhance its capacity to interpret the Constitution.67
This Section argues that constitutional authority statements are
within Congress‘s current interpretive capacity, and are themselves an
institutional rule that enhances future capacity.
1. Requiring Consideration
The first two capacity problems—that Congress forgets or is not
motivated to consider the Constitution—are reduced simply by making
constitutional deliberation a requirement. This is exactly what the
current CAS rule does. Sponsors can no longer forget to consider the
constitutionality of a bill because at the time of introduction, they are
required include a CAS. If they forget to include the CAS, the bill will
be rejected and the sponsor will have to reintroduce it with a proper
CAS. Unlike a congressional requirement to read the text of each bill,
another currently popular initiative aimed at increasing deliberative
lawmaking, CASs can easily be required and enforced.68
Members other than the sponsor are more likely to notice
constitutional issues as well. When the CAS is printed together with the
bill, Members will notice it and might think of related constitutional
issues as well. Simply putting the initial statement in front of them can
increase the amount of thought and deliberation that occurs.
Lack of motivation is a more difficult problem to address. Members
will be forced to comply with the CAS requirement to a certain extent,
but there are ways to evade the spirit of the rule while complying with
the letter. Nonspecificity, failure to mention anything in the actual
Constitution, and simply ignoring the invitation to discuss the CAS
during later deliberations will be continuing problems. Still, a
requirement a minimal amount of constitutional analysis overcomes
some of the inertia.
Part of the motivation problem is that constitutional analysis in
Congress is a public good produced by individuals, and therefore will
be underproduced. Everyone benefits when Congress is presented with
information about potential constitutional problems before a bill is
finalized. But creating that information takes time away from a
representative‘s other important tasks, including those that may have
more effect on reelection or the enactment of the Representative‘s
policy preferences.69 Legislators thus have less incentive to research the
67. See generally Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32 (proposing institutional changes to
enhance Congress‘s capacity to interpret the Constitution).
68. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135,
141–42 (2011).
69. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1301–02.
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information themselves, but prefer when others produce the information
for them.70
CASs also address this problem to a certain extent. They spread the
cost of constitutional interpretation roughly equally among
Representatives.71 Some Representatives will choose to introduce more
bills than others, raising their costs slightly, and some will introduce
more constitutionally complex or controversial bills. But placing the
initial burden of constitutional interpretation on the sponsor of the bill is
a reasonably fair method.
2. Capacity for Constitutional Authority Statements
The third complaint, regarding lack of constitutional expertise
among members of Congress and their staffs, is a serious one.
Congress‘s current interpretive capacity is probably less than that of the
courts, but it is hard to evaluate this with any accuracy.72 For the
purposes of this Article, however, we need not explore the limits of
Congress‘s interpretive capacity. The amount of interpretation required
for a CAS is small, and should be well within the limits of any member
with a lawyer on his or her staff.
The current CAS rule does not require a full statement about every
aspect of the constitutionality of a bill. It is quite easy to comply with.
The sponsor needs to fill out a form with a citation to a provision of the
Constitution. This can be extensive if desired, but need only be a single
sentence or even less.
The rule requires only that the sponsor cite ―the power or powers
granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint
resolution.‖73 It does not require an analysis of all possible
constitutional problems the bill might create.
The Constitution consists not only of power grants to Congress, but
also of overlapping power grants to the President and the courts,
affirmative limits on federal power over certain subjects, and structural
features that can bar some types of legislation. There is a large universe
of potential laws that would fall within one of the Constitution‘s power
70. Id. at 1301 (―If constitutional deliberation is an individually supplied good, individual
legislators do not internalize all of the benefits of constitutional deliberation, but do shoulder the
costs. In such a system, constitutional deliberation will be underproduced.‖). See also
BAMBERGER, supra note 51, at 150–51 (noting the importance of full and fair legislative
hearings and lamenting that they don‘t always happen).
71. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1301 (―[A]ll members would benefit from a
system that requires lawmakers to allocate some of their scarce time to the consideration of
constitutional issues . . . .‖).
72. See Michael Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525, 530–35 (2009) (listing
knowledge gaps that prevent scholars from evaluating Congress‘s constitutional performance).
73. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(c)(1) (1st Sess. 2011).
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grants to Congress, but would violate some other provision or structural
principle of the Constitution. For an obvious example, consider a law
that bans interstate sales of religious books.74 This is a straightforward
regulation of interstate commerce, a power that is granted to Congress.75
But any such law would blatantly violate the First Amendment.76
In the improbable event that a representative wanted to introduce
such a bill, the CAS would fully comply with the rule by citing only the
Commerce Clause, with no mention of the First Amendment. The
Commerce Clause is ―the power . . . granted to Congress in the
Constitution to enact the bill.‖77 The rule says nothing about citing
relevant limits on congressional power or explaining why the bill is not
barred by those limits.
This aspect of the CAS rule creates some potential problems, which
are discussed in Section III.D. But it has the advantage of making the ex
ante task of constitutional analysis manageable. The sponsor is not
expected to anticipate every possible constitutional objection to the bill
under any circumstances that may arise. He or she is required only to
address the question of Congress‘s initial authority to enact legislation
on the bill‘s subject matter.
It also prevents Representatives from wasting time on useless
constitutional analyses. Most bills raise no serious constitutional
questions, so searching for potential problems would be futile. But the
underlying question of Congress‘s authority to enact a bill arises for
every bill, not just a subset, and should be easily answered for most.
3. Increasing Capacity
In addition, constitutional authority statements build Congress‘s
interpretive capacity going forward. They force the production of
preliminary information that can then be used in debates over whether
to enact the bill. This explanation was part of the basis on which House
leadership justified the CAS rule in an introductory memo:
Just as a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget
Office informs the debate on a proposed bill, a statement
outlining the power under the Constitution that Congress
has to enact a proposed bill will inform and provide the
74. For similar examples, see, for example, Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the
Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2011) (discussing a hypothetical law banning the
interstate sale of news magazines).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (―The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .‖).
76. See id. amend. I.
77. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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basis for debate. It also demonstrates to the American
people that we in Congress understand that we have an
obligation under our founding document to stay within the
role established therein for the legislative branch.78
Information-producing regulations are popular both outside and
inside Congress. A paradigmatic example is the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to write
environmental impact statements explaining the negative environmental
effects of their proposals.79 NEPA does not raise any substantive
barriers to an agency‘s continuing with those projects. A federal agency
is free to carry out its program after thoroughly explaining exactly how
environmentally catastrophic it will be.80 But many commentators have
argued that NEPA is nonetheless effective because it increases the
available information, allows outside groups to put pressure on the
agency that is considering action, and encourages the agency to choose
actions with fewer environmental consequences when possible.81 And
unlike NEPA‘s onerous reporting requirements,82 the CAS rule does not
create large costs or delay for Congress, since it is so easy to comply
with.
Examples of information-producing regulations within Congress‘s
own deliberations include the Congressional Budget Office cost
estimates mentioned in the House memo, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995,83 and a recent proposal to require reports about the
groups that will be harmed by certain types of legislation. 84 These
regulations cannot actually stop Congress from doing something
harmful if it wants to, but they are designed to draw attention to the
potential harms in the hope that the information will influence
Congress‘s deliberative process.
Constitutional authority statements serve the same type of function.
An initial statement about the bill‘s constitutionality must be produced,
78. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43.
79. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000).
80. But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 342–43
(2004) (presenting the view of some scholars that NEPA was intended to have substantive as
well as procedural requirements).
81. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 80, at 338–39 (describing the views of NEPA‘s
―most ardent defenders‖).
82. See, e.g., id. at 339–43 (describing the heavy burdens that NEPA can place on
agencies).
83. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 423, 109 Stat. 48, 5354 (1995) (requiring congressional committees to produce reports on unfunded mandates in bills
that they approve).
84. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a
Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2–3 (2009).
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with the hope that any controversial statements will be debated as the
bill moves through the legislative process. Additional constitutional
issues that are not mentioned in the bill‘s CAS may also be noticed once
attention is directed toward constitutional deliberation in general.
Requiring a CAS at introduction, as compared with later in the
legislative process, is beneficial because it identifies potential
constitutional difficulties at the outset of deliberations, not at a late
stage where they may be impossible to correct.85
Constitutional authority statements lower the cost of constitutional
deliberations during the legislative process because they provide an
accessible starting point. Members and staff who might have neglected
to think about constitutionality amid the clash of policy and interest
group concerns are required to write a statement for their own bills, and
see a statement in front of them for other bills. The added cost from the
rule is small because writing the statements is a quick and easy task for
the majority of bills. For the small number of bills that have less
obvious constitutional authority, the increased time and deliberation is a
highly desirable investment to avoid constitutional violations.
II. THE CONTENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS
The CAS requirement is phrased in relatively vague terms, leaving
lots of room for interpretation about how to write a constitutional
authority statement. At the same time, it includes several hidden
assumptions that have the potential to affect the content of CASs in
unexpected and potentially harmful ways. The specific requirement of
the CAS rule is: ―A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless
the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a
statement citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers
granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint
resolution.‖86
A disagreement broke out over the meaning of the CAS rule on
February 11, 2011, in a committee markup.87 The episode illustrates
many of the substantive issues surrounding the interpretation of this
85. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1303 (―They need to know at an early stage
when a proposal implicates a significant constitutional issue, and then they require analysis of
the substance of the issue.‖). An even better rule would require a CAS at the beginning and at a
later stage of the legislative process. See infra Section IV.B.
86. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(c)(1) (1st Sess. 2011).
87. No transcript for this part of the subcommittee markup hearing has been published, to
my knowledge. A video of the session, lasting approximately forty minutes, can be viewed at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-and-pallone-urge-up
ton-not-to-consider-hr-358-until-it-includes-citation-of-constitution. All references to the events
of the subcommittee markup hearing are taken directly from this video.
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rule. The Subcommittee on Health, which is part of the Energy and
Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives, was beginning
a session about H.R. 358, the Protect Life Act. The highly controversial
bill, sponsored by Representative Joseph Pitts (R-Pa.), would restrict
federal funds for abortion and allow federally funded hospitals to refuse
to perform abortions.88 The bill was framed as an amendment to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), with the sponsor
of the bill claiming that portions of the unamended PPACA are
unconstitutional (presumably because they interfere with freedom of
conscience). The constitutional authority statement for H.R. 358, in its
entirety, reads as follows: ―The Protect Life Act would overturn an
unconstitutional mandate regarding abortion in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.‖89
When the hearing started, Representative Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.)
immediately raised a point of order under the CAS rule. He claimed that
the bill was not properly before the subcommittee because its
constitutional authority statement did not comply with the rule—and
therefore that the bill should have been rejected at introduction for
having an insufficient CAS. Throughout a forty-minute discussion,
which became heated at times, Representative Weiner, Representative
Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), and Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.)
made a number of complaints about the bill‘s CAS, while
Representative Joe Barton (R-Tex.) and Representative Bob Latta (ROhio) defended the sufficiency of the statement. Several questions were
directed to the committee‘s counsel, to the House Parliamentarian, and
to the House Rules Committee before the subcommittee chair ruled on
the point of order.
The discussion proceeded in a rather confused and imprecise way,
but several separate threads can be identified:
First, Representative Weiner objected that the CAS for H.R. 358 did
not cite a specific section of the Constitution. Representative Waxman
later joined this argument, reading the CASs for several other bills
aloud and noting that they all reference specific sections or clauses of
the Constitution by number (for example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3)
or by clause name (for example, the Commerce Clause). The CAS for
H.R. 358, by contrast, does not mention or even allude to any specific
section.
Second, Representative Weiner argued that to repeal a prior statute, a
representative has to say something more than ―the prior statute is
unconstitutional.‖ She has to cite some provision of the Constitution
88. H.R. 358, 112th Cong. § 2(b)-(c) (1st Sess. 2011).
89. 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for
H.R. 358 introduced by Representative Pitts).
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that provides Congress with the power to enact the new statute, not just
to repeal the prior one. Otherwise, the CAS rule would allow a
representative to enact any bill simply by saying ―I believe this bill is
constitutional.‖ Representative Latta attempted to directly rebut this
point, arguing that it is always constitutional to repeal an
unconstitutional statute, and that no other statement of authority is
necessary once the prior statute is claimed to be unconstitutional.
Third, Representative Pallone suggested that the reason the sponsor
of H.R. 358 did not cite specific constitutional authority is because it
would be impossible to do so—the bill is substantively unconstitutional
because it infringes a woman‘s right to privacy. Representative Pallone
specifically referenced Roe v. Wade90 as recognizing this right.
Fourth, Representative Barton tried to provide additional authority
for H.R. 358 that was not cited in the bill‘s CAS. He pointed to Article
I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states, ―All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,‖ as substantive
authority for Congress to amend any prior statute.
Fifth, Representative Barton argued that all of the issues raised by
Reps. Weiner and Pallone were irrelevant to the point of order under
debate. The only requirement of the rule, he claimed, is that a CAS
paper be filed with something written on it. The substantive content of
the CAS is an important subject of debate in the committee, but
insufficient content does not mean that the bill was not properly
introduced in the first place. The fact that H.R. 358 had a CAS that
Representative Weiner could read aloud meant that it was in compliance
with the rule.
Ultimately, this fifth and final point prevailed. The Chair of the
Subcommittee, acting on advice from the Parliamentarian and the Rules
Committee, ruled that a point of order cannot be used to object that the
content of a CAS is incorrect or insufficient. The fact that the CAS
document was filed with something written on it is enough to fulfill the
requirement in the House Rules.
A. Policing CAS Content
The decision not to enforce specific requirements about the content
of a CAS is frustrating, but it does not destroy the rule‘s usefulness. In
the words of Representative Waxman, ―You could say,
90. 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 358); See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing, for the first time, a woman‘s constitutional right to
abortion and locating that right in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/4

24

Volokh: Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress

2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS IN CONGRESS

197

‗Aboogaboogaboogabooga!‘ and that‘s enough to justify the
constitutionality of the proposal.‖91 If the only requirement is that the
sponsor write some random words on the form, unmotivated sponsors
can flout the requirement without a second thought.
The subcommittee chair‘s decision is consistent with the text of the
rule, though the text is certainly open to a different interpretation as
well. The rule does not lend itself to precise line-drawing, but some
minimum limits of what sorts of things qualify as ―powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution‖ and ―as specifically as practicable‖ could
be formulated and enforced.
The decision is also consistent with the initial explanation by the
House Rules Committee of how the CAS requirement would work. The
introductory memo explaining the new requirement made it clear that
the clerk of the House will not accept a bill with a blank CAS form, but
he does not check to see whether the constitutional authority is accurate
or complete.92 The memo stated that ―the adequacy and accuracy of the
citation of constitutional authority is a matter for debate in the
committees and in the House,‖ not something that would cause the bill
to be rejected on procedural grounds.93
But even without strict procedural enforcement, CASs still serve two
very important functions. First, even an incomplete CAS can spark
debate about substantive constitutional issues, even ones that are not
mentioned in the CAS at all. The shift in the subcommittee debate to the
substantive constitutionality of abortion rights, abortion restrictions, and
the health insurance mandate demonstrates that attention to one
constitutional issue can spill over to give attention to others. Second,
Representatives can encourage each other to take the rule seriously
despite the lack of hard consequences for ignoring it. Representative
Weiner‘s objection to the CAS for H.R. 358 was partially intended to
kill the bill, but it was also intended to shame the Republicans for
evading a rule they themselves had created. And as the House Rules
Memo pointed out, an inadequate or incorrect CAS can provide a reason
to vote against a bill. To the extent Representatives believe the CAS
requirement is a helpful legislative tool, they will follow the spirit of the
requirement and encourage their colleagues to do so as well.

91. Ben Weyl, Parties Spar over Interpretation of „Constitutional Authority‟ Rule, CQ
TODAY, Feb. 15, 2011.
92. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43 (―Under the rule, the clerk will not accept
the bill [if it does not have a CAS] and it will be returned to the sponsor.‖).
93. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43.
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B. Specificity
One of Representative Weiner‘s objections, though not his core
objection, to the CAS for H.R. 358 was that it was not specific enough.
Reading the CAS, he could not identify what constitutional power the
bill‘s sponsor meant to rely on. The proper level of specificity in a CAS
is unclear under the rule, but at a minimum, it should allow other
members of Congress to clearly understand the claim of congressional
power that is being made.
The rule asks Representatives to cite the constitutional authority for
a bill ―as specifically as practicable.‖ Some CASs take this requirement
very seriously, citing one or more individual clauses of the Constitution
that authorize particular powers of Congress, such as the power to
borrow money94 or the power to grant patents and copyrights.95 A few
divide the provisions of the bill into different groups and identify the
constitutional authority for each category.96
A handful of CASs engage in a thorough and highly detailed
explanation of the constitutional ramifications of the proposed
legislation. For example, the CAS for H.R. 922 includes several
paragraphs of discussion about the Federalist Papers and Supreme Court
doctrine as well as three particular clauses of the Constitution.97
Others are much less specific. In my database of all 1,709 signing
statements introduced from January through April 2011, 142 statements
cite Article I, Section 8 without further specificity. This section of the
Constitution contains most of the powers granted to Congress, and these
142 CASs do not provide any further information about which of the
eighteen clauses within Article I, Section 8 authorizes the bill.
Even worse, forty-four CASs cite simply Article I of the
Constitution with no further specificity, and an additional seven cite
Article I, Section 1, the section that vests Congress with legislative
power. This is hard to understand as anything other than a protest
against the rule, and indeed, all but two of these fifty-one CASs citing
Article I or Article I, Section 1 were introduced by Democrats. 98
Good-faith compliance with the CAS rule should in most cases mean
citing at least one specific power-granting clause of the Constitution, or
a short section that is not normally divided into clauses. The goal of the
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
95. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H434 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 397 introduced by Representative Herger).
97. See 157 Cong. Rec. H1576 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 922 introduced by Representative Gosar).
98. By contrast, significant numbers of both Republicans and Democrats cited Article I,
Section 8.
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rule is for Congress to ensure that it is passing only legislation that falls
within its enumerated powers. That goal is not served by a general wave
of the hand, saying that it must be in Article I, Section 8 somewhere.
Certain broadly worded clauses of the Constitution raise a more
difficult question. The Commerce Clause,99 the Necessary and Proper
Clause,100 and the General Welfare Clause101 have all been recognized
as allowing Congress significant leeway to regulate in areas not
specifically mentioned by the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, these are
popular clauses to cite in a CAS, particularly when the subject of the
bill is not covered by any of the more specific constitutional power
grants.102
Some critics might say that citing these very general, open-ended
clauses defeats the purpose of the rule. If Congress can claim that
basically anything is justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it
is not really being specific about its constitutional powers.
Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey, an early proponent of
constitutional authority statements, has proposed banning citation to
clauses like these.103
Yet, there is no denying that these broadly worded clauses do grant
powers to Congress—lots of powers. Requiring Congress to identify the
part of the Constitution that allows them to enact a bill, and then
forbidding them to cite particular parts of the Constitution in response to
the question, is ridiculous. If taken seriously, it would be almost
equivalent to striking those clauses from the Constitution.
The concern behind Representative Garrett‘s proposal is real,
however. Citing to general clauses reduces the impact of the rule. A
representative could justify everything with reference to the General
Welfare Clause and never engage in any more specific constitutional
analysis about the particular subjects of the legislation he or she
introduces.

99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
101. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
102. In my January through April 2011 database, the Commerce Clause was cited alone
278 times, the Necessary and Proper Clause was cited alone 128 times, and the General Welfare
Clause was cited alone 260 times. These clauses were also cited many times in combination
with another clause, raising the overall specificity of the CAS.
103. See H.R. Res. 1754, 111th Cong. (2010); David A. Fahrenthold, Congress Finds, and
Lists, Meaning in Constitution, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2011, available at http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/congress-finds-and-lists-meaning-in-constitution/2011/09/14/gIQA1VQ
zXK_print.html (―[Representative] Garrett had pressed for a more restrictive version of the rule,
which would ban members from citing the ‗necessary and proper‘ and ‗general welfare‘
clauses.‖).
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Responsible legislators can deal with this problem in a much less
drastic way, fortunately. CASs that cite these broad clauses should
include a brief explanation why the bill‘s subject falls within the cited
clause. This is not particularly important for CASs that cite specific
clauses—it is obvious, for example, why a bill making changes to patent
law is justified under the Patent Clause.104 But the question of whether a
bill setting physical education requirements for public schools is
authorized by the clause that says, ―The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States‖?105 That is a more difficult question.
An explanation can make the sponsor‘s reasoning much clearer. For
example, the CAS for H.R. 1201 cites the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and then explains, ―This [power] includes the ability to hire staff to
assist in the execution of the foregoing powers and to define the salaries
and benefits of those staff.‖
C. Textual vs. Structural Constitutional Authority
The crux of Representative Weiner‘s objection, though, was not that
the CAS for H.R. 358 was too vague. It was that H.R. 358 did not
attempt to cite a textual provision of the Constitution at all. It does not
refer to anything ―in the Constitution.‖ It only states that the bill would
repeal a prior statute, and that the prior statute is unconstitutional. No
part of the Constitution, Representative Weiner correctly pointed out,
explicitly grants Congress the power to repeal unconstitutional statutes.
This objection brings to light a crucial question about the CAS rule.
Does ―citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted
to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill‖ mean that the bill‘s
sponsor must point to an explicit, textual power grant in the
Constitution?
Not all powers granted by the Constitution are apparent from the text
alone. Even the most ardent textualist understands that some
governmental powers arise out of the structure of the Constitution,
without any textual authority that is directly on point.106
104. The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, a major piece of patent legislation that was
enacted during the 112th Congress, cites the Patent Clause in its constitutional authority
statement. See Constitutional Authority Statement, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (introduced by
Representative Smith on Mar. 30, 2011) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
105. See Constitutional Authority Statement, H.R. 422, 112th Cong. (introduced by
Representative Baca on Jan. 25, 2011) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
106. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
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One example is the President‘s power to remove executive
officers.107 The Constitution is very specific how to appoint executive
officers,108 but does not make any mention of removing them except by
impeachment.109 Surely there must be some way to remove executive
officers who are not doing a good job but have not committed an
impeachable offense. After a near-crippling series of inter-branch
disputes about who can exercise this power (not about whether it can be
exercised at all), the Supreme Court reasoned from structural principles
that the President can generally remove executive officers unless
Congress gives them special protection in certain circumstances.110
Congress, too, may have constitutional powers that are rooted more
in structure than in text. The sponsor of H.R. 358 seems to allude to one
of these, though he does not state it explicitly. The CAS for the bill can
reasonably be read as calling on a structural power of Congress to
repeal unconstitutional statutes. It would seem strange to say that this
power does not exist at all. If Congress passes an unconstitutional
statute, it intuitively seems that Congress should be able to undo its own
mistake. It should not have to wait for a Presidential veto, an executive
decision not to enforce the statute, or a judicial ruling of
unconstitutionality. Congress should be able to just repeal the statute.
For most repeals, there may be textual provisions that also justify the
repeal bill. But in some cases—particularly those where the
unconstitutionality arises from Congress exceeding its enumerated
powers, rather than from violating a constitutional limit—there may be
nothing other than the structural argument to justify the repeal bill.
I do not think the CAS rule forbids citation to structural powers.
Despite not being explicit in the text, these powers are nonetheless truly
in the Constitution. To serve the specificity requirement, a sponsor
relying on a structural power should make it clear that the power is
structural, and perhaps provide a brief explanation of the structural
concerns that lead to the recognition of this power. Thus, my view is
that the CAS for H.R. 358 could have been more clearly written, but
that it fundamentally does comply with the rule because it refers to a
legitimate structural power of Congress.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (explaining the importance of structural reasoning in
constitutional law).
107. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
108. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
109. See id. art. II, § 4 (―The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.‖).
110. See Humphrey‘s Ex‘r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

202

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

D. Powers vs. Limits, Revisited
Up to this point, we have been assuming that the rule‘s focus on the
powers of Congress means that a CAS need not address external limits
that the Constitution places on any exercise of congressional power.
While this interpretation of the rule has benefits, primarily in ease of
compliance, it also has a significant drawback. It may encourage
Congress to interpret its own powers even more broadly than it already
does.
The goal of the CAS rule was to focus Congress‘s attention on its
enumerated powers to prevent it from exceeding those powers. It was
created as a response to what Republicans saw as congressional
overreach under Democratic leadership. The result, however, is a large
amount of attention to the Constitution‘s power grants with almost no
attention to its limits on congressional power (or to limits on federal
power in general). This could lead to Congress adopting an even more
expansive view of its own powers than previously. Just as the Executive
Branch has a tendency to interpret executive powers broadly, Congress
is likely to interpret its own legislative powers broadly. 111 Every time a
CAS cites the Commerce Clause as authority to enact a statute having
limited effects on interstate commerce, it bolsters the broad
interpretation of that clause.
One way to avoid this outcome is to require attention to
constitutional limits. It‘s even possible to read the current CAS rule
broadly to require a full discussion of constitutionality. One could argue
that something is not within ―the power or powers granted to Congress
in the Constitution‖ if some other part of the Constitution prevents
Congress from doing that thing.
But if the House of Representatives had intended to require a full
statement of the constitutionality of each bill, it would most likely have
used more natural language for that requirement, such as asking the
sponsor to provide a ―statement explaining why the bill is constitutional,
with citations to specific constitutional provisions‖ or used something
akin to the term coined by Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, a

111. Congress also tends to adopt a broad view of its own oversight powers, particularly
with respect to the administrative agencies. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated,
It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 (Autumn 1993) (noting that Congress
continues to enact statutes with legislative veto provisions even after such procedures were held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Chadha); see, e.g., Constitutional Authority
Statement, H.R. 1104, 112th Cong. (introduced by Representative Stutzman on Mar. 15, 2011)
(expressing a broad view of Congress‘s ―constitutionally prescribed rule to direct the
Environmental Protection Agency, a body which regulates interstate commerce under the
auspices of Congress‖).
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―constitutional impact statement.‖112 Instead, the House chose to focus
Representatives‘ attention on the power to enact.
From the outset of adopting the rule, it has been explained as
requiring citation to powers, not limits. The House Rules Memo states
that a CAS should include ―the Member‘s name and signature, the title
of the measure it accompanies, and a citation to the power or powers
granted in the Constitution to enact the bill.‖113 Nothing is said about
citing other relevant portions of the Constitution aside from power
grants.114 All but one of the examples given in the memo also follow
this format, citing only power grants, not other constitutional
provisions.115
Actual CASs in the 112th Congress have overwhelmingly tended to
follow the example of the memo and cite only power grants, not
limiting clauses. The majority of CASs cite only a single powergranting clause of the Constitution. Many cite a combination of powergranting clauses, for example a specific provision combined with the
Necessary and Proper Clause or several of the military clauses116
together. Mentions of individual rights are quite scarce. In my CAS
database of 1,709 bills and resolutions, the First Amendment appears
only six times, the Second Amendment also appears six times, the
Fourth Amendment appears only three times, and sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment (other than the explicit power grant in Section
Five) appear only nineteen times.117 Representatives are clearly
focusing on power grants, not individual rights or other limits on power,
when they write CASs.
Perhaps the deliberation-forcing aspect of CASs will counteract the
initial focus on powers alone. If limits that are overlooked in a CAS are
nonetheless discussed in the committee rooms and on the floor of the
House, this concern would be significantly lessened. However, if the
112. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1310.
113. Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43.
114. See id.
115. See id. (presenting five sample CASs which cite (1) ―the power of Congress to make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces‖ (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
14); (2) the grant of congressional power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment; (3) the
Commerce Clause; (4) the General Welfare Clause and the Sixteenth Amendment (granting
Congress the power to enact an income tax); and (5) a structural power to repeal federal laws by
―return[ing] power to the States and to the people, in accordance with Amendment X of the
United States Constitution.‖). The last example, citing the Tenth Amendment, is somewhat
different from the others in that the Tenth Amendment is a limit on federal power, not a power
grant to Congress. However, the memo uses it as textual support for an affirmative structural
power of Congress to repeal existing law (presumably including laws that are unconstitutional).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–16.
117. Data on file with author.
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focus on powers alone causes Congress to continually ignore its limits,
requiring consideration of limits as well as powers might be
appropriate.118
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Constitutional authority statements are published, publicly available,
and attached to a large percentage of bills that become law, if not all of
them.119 Some of these laws will eventually be challenged as being
unconstitutional. When that happens, how will courts treat the
constitutional authority statements? This Part explains why courts
should not, and most likely will not, treat them as binding on the court‘s
decisions.
A. Constitutional Authority Statements as Legislative History
Congress‘s basic message in a CAS is that the bill under
consideration will be constitutional if enacted into law. How should the
courts treat this legislative determination?
As currently structured, CASs are a form of legislative history,120
and a very weak form at that. Several factors can make items of
legislative history more authoritative, but CASs exhibit few of these.
1. Authoritativeness: Whom Does it Speak For?
CASs are not law. They are not included in the text of the bill, and
they are not enacted by Congress through the Article I, Section 7
process. Thus, they cannot be binding on courts. Judges might choose to
rely to some extent on a CAS for interpretive purposes, or they might
find themselves in agreement with a CAS in a particular case, but they
are not bound by the CAS that was attached to the bill. CASs are just
another form of legislative history.
Courts weight different types of legislative history differently.. In
general, a piece of legislative history is most authoritative if it speaks
118. See infra Subsection V.A.2.
119. A CAS is mandatory for all bills that originate in the House of Representatives. Bills
that originate in the Senate may or may not be assigned a CAS when they are introduced in the
House of Representatives, at the discretion of the chair of the committee of jurisdiction over the
bill in the House. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (adopting rules for the 112th
Congress, including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement).
120. A memo prepared by the House Rules Committee to instruct Members about how to
comply with the new CAS requirement acknowledges that the statements will be legislative
history. See Rules Committee Memo, supra note 43 (―To the extent that a court looks at the
legislative history of an Act, the Constitutional Authority Statement would be part of that
history. However, the courts have made clear that they will not uphold an unconstitutional law
simply on the basis that Congress thinks that the law is constitutional.‖).
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for a large portion of Congress. A committee report carries more weight
than a floor statement in part because the report is approved by a
majority of the committee while a floor statement is the remark of a
single person.121 A conference committee report also carries great
weight because it is a document written by members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate together, providing a view of at least
some of the members of both houses.122
A constitutional authority statement is the statement of a single
member of Congress. The sponsor of a bill writes the CAS at the time
the bill is introduced. Perhaps every member of Congress might agree
with the CAS, but it would be difficult for a judge to determine that. It
is equally possible that everyone disagreed with the CAS but had no
way of changing it.123 A judge might turn to committee reports or floor
debate to look for wider approval or disapproval of the CAS. If he does
so, however, the judicial reliance is on the other statements as much as
or more than on the CAS itself.
The CAS might be given slightly more authority by courts than the
average floor statement, on the grounds that it is a statement by the
sponsor of the bill. Sponsor statements are sometimes treated as more
authoritative than statements of other supporters or of opponents to the
bill.124 A CAS written by the sponsor of a bill at the time of its
introduction might be thought to be a particularly well-considered and
researched statement, thus gaining more authority in the eyes of a court.
Even so, the CAS is a statement of a single member of the House of
Representatives, one among the hundreds in that house and entirely
unrepresentative of the views of the Senate. A CAS created in the way
the House of Representatives currently requires them to be created is a
very weak form of legislative history.
2. Usefulness: Does the CAS Make Legal Arguments?
Most CASs are fairly straightforward legal statements, of the type
that would be recognized and understood by lawyers and judges. But a
few are something quite different. This is best illustrated by example.
121. There are many additional reasons that committee reports are seen as more
authoritative, including the focused attention of the committee members on the bill, expertise,
and thorough explication of the issues. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 162 (2008) (explaining why committee reports are generally seen as a more
persuasive form of legislative history).
122. See id. at 162 (placing conference committee reports at the top of the legislative
history persuasiveness hierarchy).
123. See infra Section V.A.
124. See JELLUM, supra note 121, at 163–64 (summarizing arguments for and against
treating a sponsor or drafter‘s statement more favorably than the statements of others).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

206

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

H.R. 1420, introduced by Representative Jesse Jackson Jr., is the
Civil War Sesquicentennial Commission Act.125 The bill would direct
the Secretary of Interior to appoint a ―Civil War Sesquicentennial
Commemoration Commission‖126 composed of twenty-five members,
including several specified government officials and a number of
private citizens with relevant expertise.127 The commission would ―plan,
develop, and carry out programs and activities appropriate to
commemorate the sesquicentennial of the Civil War,‖128 and undertake
various similar educational and celebratory activities.129 The bill also
deals with various financial matters regarding the Commission,
including a general appropriation to carry out the Act,130 travel expenses
for official business,131 and staff.132
A lawyer would look at this bill and immediately point out several
relevant clauses of the Constitution: the Appointments Clause for
appointing officers,133 the General Welfare Clause for spending money
on the project,134 perhaps the clause that requires all appropriations to
be made by law.135 It would be prudent to throw in the Necessary and
Proper Clause136 as well, because not all of the Commission‘s functions
are squarely within Congress‘s enumerated powers. One might also note
a potential Incompatibility Clause137 problem because the bill requires
two Senators and two Representatives to be appointed to the
Commission, but these types of ceremonial offices are rarely
challenged.
Representative Jackson did not cite any of these clauses when he
introduced the bill. Instead, he cited the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.138
125. H.R. 1420, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
126. Id. § 3.
127. Id. § 4.
128. Id. § 6.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 10.
131. Id. § 9(b).
132. Id. § 9(c).
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
134. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;‖).
135. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖).
136. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
137. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (―No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased [sic] during such
time . . . .‖).
138. 157 Cong. Rec. H2535 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
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The Civil War Amendments are relevant to H.R. 1420 only in spirit,
not in substance. The bill‘s provisions have nothing to do with
preventing involuntary servitude;139 with protecting the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of privileges and immunities, due process, or
equal protection;140 or with guaranteeing the right to vote.141
But Representative Jackson‘s CAS nonetheless has an underlying
appeal to it. The purpose of the bill is to remind the American public of
how the Civil War Amendments came about and why they are
important, and to commemorate the struggle that led to their creation.
The amendments are relevant to the bill symbolically. It seems crass to
say that Representative Jackson should not have cited them because
they are not substantively relevant to the content of his bill. Perhaps it
would be more fair to say that he should have cited them along with the
legally relevant clauses, however.
Representative Jackson‘s signing statement exemplifies a category
of aspirational signing statements.142 While they are important for
expressing the values and purposes behind legislative proposals, they
are no help in defending a statute against constitutional challenges. The
content of H.R. 1420 is constitutionally unobjectionable, so this
particular CAS does not matter much. But one could imagine a similar
CAS for a blatantly unconstitutional law (for example, banning all
books containing racial slurs), or for a highly questionable law (for
example, exempting minorities from paying income taxes). In those
cases, an aspirational CAS would have no weight at all in court.
Congress‘s statements about the Constitution can legitimately be of a
different style than judicial statements about the Constitution.143 Judges
speak about the Constitution in the course of deciding particular cases
and controversies.144 The question for a judge is whether a particular
for H.R. 1420 introduced by Representative Jackson).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
140. Id. amend. XIV.
141. Id. amend. XV.
142. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H2571 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 1457 introduced by Representative Luetkemeyer) (citing the religious
protections in the First Amendment as authority for a bill to review Jewish WWI veterans for
Medal of Honor awards); see, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H1843 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2011)
(Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 1093 introduced by Representative King) (citing
the Second Amendment as authority for a bill making detailed changes to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives).
143. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1319 (―Congressional staff should be
encouraged to analyze any judicial advice rigorously through the legislative lens, remembering
that the legalistic approach of judges may not be as appropriate for Congress.‖); see also Brest,
supra note 39 (arguing that Members of Congress should apply stricter tests of constitutionality
than those used by courts).
144. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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piece of legislation, or a particular application of a law, or a particular
executive action, violates the Constitution.145 This has a tendency to
result in narrow, legalistic holdings about particular discrete issues,
though of course the courts occasionally speak more broadly about
constitutional values or structure.
Congress attempts a much larger task. Yes, Congress should analyze
whether each particular bill is within its powers and whether the bill
violates an express prohibition in the Constitution. But Congress also
creates legislation that changes the structure of government and of
society. It creates legislation that rewards certain behavior and punishes
other behavior. In doing so, Congress acts not only on the express
power grants and limits in the Constitution, but also on the values that
give it life.146 When Representative Jackson cited the Civil War
Amendments in his CAS, he did not mean that those clauses formally
provided power grants for Congress to enact the legislation. He meant
that the values of equality and freedom expressed in those amendments
were what inspired his bill.
Aspirational statements about the Constitution are appropriate for
Congress. They are not, however, helpful to the courts. If Congress
intends to influence judicial interpretation with CASs, it will need to use
styles of argument that the courts can engage with. But if Congress
primarily intends CASs to be a tool for its own deliberations,
aspirational statements are appropriate and even important.
3. Thoroughness: Does the CAS Address the Problem Presented to the
Courts?
When a statute is challenged, the constitutional question presented to
the court might not be addressed at all in the constitutional authority
statement for that statute. Some CASs are quite thorough, but most cite
only a single point of authority for the statute. 147 As discussed above,148
the question of underlying constitutional authority may not answer all
possible constitutional questions about a bill.
A particular CAS might correctly cite authority to pass a bill from
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, while failing
145. See Tulis, supra note 65, at 519 (―For a court, anything within a wide ambit of
constitutionally permissible actions is legitimate, but legislators might responsibly oppose
legislation on the ground that it did not advance constitutional purposes enough or at all.‖).
146. Id. at 519 (―Whether a policy or a body of policies advances the constitutional
aspirations of a people is a legitimate ground for a legislative decision, even though it would not
be appropriate for a judicial decision.‖).
147. In January through April of 2011, around two-thirds of CASs cited only a single
clause of the Constitution.
148. See supra Subsection II.B.2 and Section III.D.
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to mention due process or First Amendment issues that arguably prevent
the bill from being applied in certain ways. Or the CAS might make no
mention of the Appointments Clause in a bill that sets up a novel
method for appointing officers, citing authority only for the basic
subject of the bill rather than for each provision. While the Supreme
Court does sometimes entertain enumerated powers challenges,149
questions about less-central aspects of a bill are far more common.150
Thus, in many cases, a bill‘s CAS will not even be relevant to the
constitutional challenge brought against it.
Even where a CAS is relevant to the question presented to a court, it
is likely to provide little information. A lawsuit might challenge the
underlying content of a bill, such as by arguing that it exceeds
Congress‘s powers under the Commerce Clause, or a bill with a more
extensive CAS may be challenged on grounds mentioned in the CAS.
But a CAS is not a legal brief. It usually provides only a bare statement
that certain clauses of the Constitution provide authority. CASs with
lengthy explanations of why or how the clause is relevant, or even any
explanation at all, are few and far between.
Presented with a CAS alone, a court will essentially have the choice
to defer to Congress or ignore the statement. The CAS may assert, for
example, that the bill under consideration is authorized by the
Commerce Clause and does not violate the First Amendment. It
provides no reasoning, no rebuttal of arguments to the contrary, and no
explanation. The conclusion is simply stated. And recall, this statement
is not one explicitly affirmed by Congress as a whole, but by an
individual member of the House of Representatives. For the court, it is
no choice at all. It cannot defer to the CAS alone without engaging in
further analysis.
Of course, the court might look to additional legislative history to
seek out a more thorough explanation of the CAS and to find agreement
by a larger number of members. But this is not reliance on the CAS, it is
reliance on legislative history more broadly.
This is not meant to be an indictment of CASs. The fact is that they
serve a different purpose. A CAS, as currently designed, is not intended
149. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (reviewing the constitutionality of the
Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act under the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (reviewing the
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause).
150. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (reviewing a law
regulating interstate commerce solely for Appointments Clause violations); Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (reviewing a law regulating interstate commerce solely for First
Amendment violations). Both of these statutes were passed before constitutional authority
statements were required in the House of Representatives.
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to be an authoritative statement of Congress. It is not meant to be a
guide to judicial interpretation. It is meant to be a tool for Congress
itself to use. When a bill is introduced and sent to committee, the CAS
serves as a starting point for discussion about the constitutionality of the
bill. It is meant to trigger further debate and analysis when necessary,
not to be the end of the discussion. Courts should be able to recognize
this and treat CASs accordingly.
B. Constitutional Estoppel
In a small number of cases, a problem that might be called
―constitutional estoppel‖ could arise. When a statute is challenged for
lack of underlying congressional authority to enact it, and the CAS
addresses one possible source of congressional authority but not
another, the petitioners might argue that the law cannot be defended on
the second ground because Congress did not cite it. The question is,
should the courts be limited to the one or more clauses cited by
Congress when assessing the statute‘s constitutionality?
This type of controversy has arisen recently, with a statute that does
not include a formal constitutional authority statement. The Affordable
Care Act151 that was enacted during the 111th Congress was passed
before the House rules required CASs. Nonetheless, the bill text itself
included a statement about the constitutionality of the bill, citing a
Supreme Court case that held insurance to be a form of interstate
commerce.152 Supporters repeatedly justified the mandate as a
regulation of interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of
the Constitution,153 against the fervent objections of opponents who
claimed the Commerce Clause could not reach an individual‘s decision
to not purchase insurance. These same supporters, including President
Barack Obama,154 vigorously denied that the fines for not purchasing
individual insurance were a tax, which would have been justified by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.155 When the law was
challenged in court and the argument that it violates the Commerce
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
152. See Affordable Care Act § 1501(A)(3) (citing United States v. Se. Underwriters
Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (―The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes‖).
154. See, e.g., Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS, Sept. 20,
2009, transcript of interview of Pres. Obama, available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/ (―[F]or us to say that you‘ve got to take a responsibility to
get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase.‖).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (―The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises‖).
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Clause was seen to be stronger than supporters initially thought, lawyers
began defending it as an exercise of Congress‘s taxing power.156 The
Supreme Court eventually upheld the statue on the grounds that it is a
valid exercise of Congress‘s power to tax.157
The existence of constitutional authority statements could make this
situation occur more frequently. In the past, Congress has not explicitly
stated a constitutional justification when enacting most statutes. After
the rule change, however, many statutes come with such a statement.158
Should these statements be seen as binding, in the sense that if a statute
cites improper constitutional authority, it is invalid regardless of
whether another part of the Constitution would justify it?
A few members of Congress have shown concern about this
possibility, and have attempted to address it in the CASs themselves.
This can be done in several ways.
One simple way is to make the CAS as broad as possible, for
instance by citing Article I of the Constitution without any further
specificity,159 or by citing the entirety of Article I, Section 8, which
contains most of the individual power grants to Congress.160 Of course,
this approach reduces the CASs usefulness to Congress as a deliberative
tool, as discussed above.161
A similar tactic, but one which requires more individual attention to
the particulars of the bill in question, is to cite numerous clauses of the
Constitution for the same bill. So, for example, one short bill (only

156. See, e.g., Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the
individual mandate exceeds Congress‘s Commerce Clause power and that it is not a tax)
vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 11-420, 2012 WL 2470098 (June 29, 2012);
see also Ben Wilterdink, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate: Is It a Tax or Not a Tax?,
WASH. EXAMINER, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/the-individualhealth-insurance-mandate-is-it-a-tax-or-not-a-tax/article/140265 (collecting conflicting government
statements about whether the mandate is a tax or not).
157. Nat. Fed. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–2601 (2012).
158. Statutes that originate in the Senate may or may not acquire a CAS when introduced
in the House of Representatives. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the
112th Congress, including the Constitutional Authority Statement requirement).
159. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H397 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 377 introduced by Representative Lee) (―The power granted to Congress
under Article I of the United States Constitution and its subsequent amendments, and further
clarified and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.‖).
160. Citations to Article I, Section 8 without further elaboration in CASs are too numerous
to list. A representative example is 157 Cong. Rec. H396 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2011)
(Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 372 introduced by Representative Buchanan)
(―The constitutional authority on which this legislation rests is the power of Congress
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.‖).
161. See supra Section II.B.
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about a page of text) has a CAS that cites nine separate clauses of the
Constitution.162
Several legislators have included various forms of savings clauses in
CASs. One states, ―The authority to enact this bill is derived from, but
may not be limited to, Article I, Section 8.‖163 Others cite one or more
clauses and then append the disclaimer, ―The specific Constitutional
Authority cited here is not intended and should not be construed to be
exclusive of any other general or specific Constitutional Authority that
is otherwise applicable.‖164
These are statements that clearly have judicial interpretation in mind.
The legislators are citing the constitutional authority they believe to be
appropriate, but stating the possibility that there might be other sources
of constitutional authority as well.
Another type of statement is even more intriguing. One bill‘s CAS
cites some constitutional authority and then announces: ―Further, this
statement of constitutional authority is made for the sole purpose of
compliance with clause 7 of Rule XII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives and shall have no bearing on judicial review of the
accompanying bill.‖165 This statement is not a hedge, but is an explicit
instruction to courts that they should not use this piece of legislative
history in further interpretation. Will the courts honor this statement? It
remains to be seen. Statutory instructions of interpretive methodology
are controversial enough;166 legislative history instructions of
162. See 157 Cong. Rec. H2267 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 1323 introduced by Representative Bartlett) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2;
id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12, 13; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3).
163. 157 Cong. Rec. H1456 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
for H.R. 862 introduced by Representative Murphy) The phrase ―may not be limited to‖ can be
read in two different ways. Representative Murphy may have been tentatively suggesting that
other clauses of the Constitution might also authorize the bill he was introducing, or he may
have been ordering the courts that they are not permitted to limit Congress‘s justification for the
bill to the section he cited.
164. 157 Cong. Rec. H1455 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement
for H.R. 845 introduced by Representative Rehberg); 157 Cong. Rec. H1455 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 846 introduced by Representative
Labrador).
165. 157 Cong. Rec. H552 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for
H.R. 559 introduced by Representative Richmond)
166. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003) (arguing
that legislated statutory interpretation rules cannot bind future interpreters); Abbe R. Gluck, The
States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (examining legislated statutory
interpretation rules in the states); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (advocating a federal system of legislated
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interpretive methodology are likely to be either ignored or used only
strategically.
IV. TOWARD A STRONGER CAS?
The primary criticism of adopting the CAS rule in the House was
that the statements would be ineffective and useless. This Article has
shown why that assessment is mistaken. However, the rule requiring
CASs is not as strong as it could be. This Part discusses several ways
that Congress could make CASs stronger, and also some problems that
would arise under those stronger regimes.
The CAS rule currently exists only in the House of Representatives.
Due to the low cost and good effects of the rule, the Senate would
benefit from adopting some form of it as well. The considerations
regarding several types of CAS rules discussed here apply equally to the
House and the Senate.
The reforms discussed here fall into two general categories, though
there is some overlap between the categories. The first category consists
of reforms that require or encourage increased deliberation about
constitutional issues within Congress: (1) requiring CASs at several
stages of the legislative process, and (2) requiring discussion of
constitutional limits as well as powers. Reforms of this type would be
very beneficial to ensure that a CAS actually starts a constitutional
discussion when serious issues are raised.
The second category consists of reforms that are designed to make
constitutional authority statements more majoritarian and thus more
influential with the courts: (1) requiring a separate floor vote on a CAS
before the substance of the bill is voted on, and (2) putting the CAS in
the text of the bill instead of legislative history. While these reforms
would have some benefits, they also raise serious problems that counsel
against their adoption.
A. Deliberation-Increasing Reforms
The current rule requires that the Representative who introduces the
bill must include a CAS. What happens if, after introduction, other
Representatives believe the CAS is incorrect? What if amendments to
the bill change or add to its constitutional basis? What if opponents
want to draw attention to constitutional limits that they believe make the
bill unconstitutional, but that are not addressed in the CAS? The rule in
its present form makes no provision for changing a CAS after a bill has
been introduced.

statutory interpretation rules).
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A public and formal opportunity to change or object to a CAS would
raise the incentives for constitutional deliberation.167 The opportunity
for debate already exists under the current rule, but the lack of ability to
rewrite the CAS may discourage members from raising their objections.
If they cannot affect the content of the CAS, they may feel no need to
air their concerns. Allowing the opportunity to amend the CAS creates
an incentive to debate and decide the constitutional questions. This
section suggests several ways that Congress could modify the CAS rule
to provide a greater opportunity for deliberation and change.
1. Require CASs at Multiple Stages of the Legislative Process
Prior to the adoption of the current CAS rule, the House of
Representatives required that committee reports include a constitutional
authority statement. This rule was adopted in the 105th Congress. 168 It
was retained in the House Rules until the 112th Congress, when it was
replaced by the rule requiring CASs for all bills and joint resolutions at
introduction.169
The change from committee CASs to introduction CASs was
portrayed as strengthening the Representatives‘ commitment to
constitutional limits on government power.170 In some ways, that is true.
Requiring a CAS at introduction puts more eyes on the Constitution,
because a larger number of people are tasked with writing them. It also
forces the sponsor of every bill to take personal responsibility for the
constitutionality of that bill, instead of leaving it for consideration later.
Additionally, the introduction rule means that Congress is making more
statements about the Constitution overall, because only a fraction of the
bills introduced ever receive committee reports.
Most importantly, an introduction CAS means that a statement about
the Constitution is available from the outset, and can be discussed and
debated during committee meetings. By contrast, committee report
CASs were probably often added by staffers after the bill was approved
by the committee, without any prior discussion of constitutionality
167. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1304 (―[M]embers must be afforded an
opportunity to raise constitutional issues and to deliberate about them fully.‖).
168. See H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. § 13(4) (1997) (―Each report of a committee on a bill or
joint resolution of a public character shall include a statement citing the specific powers granted
to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill or joint resolution.‖).
169. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress and
striking the provision that previously required CASs in committee reports); H.R. Res. 5,
Adopting Rules for the 112th Congress, Section-by-Section Analysis, http://rules.house.gov/
Media/file/PDF/HRes%205%20Sec-by-Sec.pdf, at 1 (explaining that the new rule ―repeals the
current requirement for a similar [constitutional authority] statement in committee reports‖).
170. Most commonly, the new rule was portrayed as completely unprecedented, with the
committee CAS rule never mentioned.
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among the Representatives. The new rule places the constitutionality of
the bill on the agenda from the time that committee members begin their
consideration. They may choose not to discuss it, but the CAS serves as
a reminder that they should think about it.
In other ways, however, the rule change produces weaker
constitutional authority statements. The introduction CASs are written
by people with less expertise than those who wrote the committee
CASs. The introduction CASs are thus less likely to be complete and
accurate statements about the constitutionality of the bill.171 Also, a bill
can change substantially between introduction and adoption by the
committee, and even a perfect CAS for the introduced bill may not
match up with the bill as it emerges from the committee.
Committees and their staffs, in general, have a greater ability to
write thorough CASs than individual members do. A committee has a
larger staff than an individual Representative, and that staff is able to
specialize in a particular subject matter of legislation. While various
clauses of the Constitution may still be implicated in a single subject
matter area, this narrows the field at least somewhat.172 Committees also
generally have a longer period of time to consider legislation, and most
of the discussion and debate about a bill goes on in committee
meetings.173 Even more helpfully, committees frequently hold hearings
in which experts, including experts on constitutional issues, can
contribute to the deliberations.174
There is an easy solution to these problems: CASs should be
required both at introduction and in the committee report. The
introduction CAS preserves the benefits of having many eyes on the
Constitution and placing a statement of constitutionality on the agenda
for committee discussions. The committee report CAS takes advantage
of a more expert staff and the deliberations that happened in committee
171. This is not universally true. A number of introduction CASs under the new rule are
highly detailed. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H2107 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2011) (Constitutional
Authority Statement for H.R. 1255 introduced by Representative Womack) (breaking down the
constitutional authority for the bill section by section); 157 Cong. Rec. H2604 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 2011) (Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 1474 introduced by Representative
Duncan) (presenting extensive analysis and explanation of the constitutional authority for the
bill, including the basis of an exemption for the postal service).
172. Garrett and Vermeule point out that specialized committees devoted to constitutional
issues would do a better job of constitutional analysis than policy subject-matter committees.
See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1319–22. That is certainly true. However, it would
require a much larger change in the committee structure, and thus is less likely to be adopted.
Reinstating the committee report CAS rule in addition to the introduction CAS rule requires no
structural change to the committee system at all.
173. See id. at 1319.
174. See id. at 1304.
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meetings to make the statement more thorough and lawyerly,
incorporate any necessary changes after the bill is amended in
committee, and put the full committee‘s stamp of approval on the
statement.
Requiring two CASs does not mean there will be twice as much
work. The vast majority of bills are obviously constitutional. If the
introduction CAS for a clearly constitutional bill is sufficient, the
committee staff can copy it directly into the committee report. Even if
the introduction CAS has some problems or omissions, the committee
staff has something to start with. Additionally, only a small fraction of
bills that are introduced are ever approved by committees. Bills that die
in committee will never receive a committee report CAS.
This is a case where the sum of the parts can be greater than the
whole. Requiring both an introduction and a committee report CAS
enhances both the opportunity and the incentives for constitutional
deliberation in committees. If a CAS is required only at introduction,
and is never formally changed, there is little incentive to discuss or
object to it.175 If it is required only in the committee report, then the
constitutional questions may not be noticed or discussed until after the
committee deliberation is complete. When both are required, the
introduction CAS serves as a reminder to discuss the constitutional
aspects of the bill and a starting point for that discussion. Deliberation
within the committee is encouraged because another CAS will be
required in the committee report, this time with the backing of all the
committee members. This structure encourages the most thoughtful and
complete discussion of the constitutionality of each bill that moves
through Congress.
2. Discussion of Constitutional Bars to Legislation
The current CAS rule focuses Congress‘s attention only on its grants
of authority, not on other clauses of the Constitution that set limits on
the exercise of its powers. For a full debate of constitutionality,
Congress must consider both.176
It would be difficult to require constitutional problems to be
identified from the outset. The sponsor of a bill is usually quite
enthusiastic about the policy proposal and has no interest in drawing
attention to potential problems, even if she does notice their existence.
She may be simply introducing a policy idea rather than a fully formed
legislative proposal, counting on the committee process to turn the idea

175. See supra Section IV.A.
176. See supra Section II.D.
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into a legally functioning and constitutionally compliant bill.177 And she
probably is not an expert on constitutional doctrine that could cause
problems for the bill, either.
Some scholars have suggested that the parliamentarians of the House
and Senate should identify constitutional issues in pending legislation
and alert members of Congress to those issues.178 That would certainly
be helpful, but as others have pointed out, even the most careful
parliamentarian could easily miss some constitutional issues on an ex
ante analysis.179
A better solution is to create a formal procedure for any member to
raise potential constitutional problems with a bill. This could be done
through an amendment proposal to the CAS, through a separate
procedure of registering an objection to the constitutionality of a bill, or
by making CASs subject to a point of order to raise additional
constitutional questions. Opponents of the bill, not the sponsor, will be
most likely to search for constitutional problems. They may seek to use
constitutional objections as a delaying tactic, so the procedure should be
designed to prevent frivolous complaints from derailing a bill.180 But the
primary advantage of allowing every member to raise formal
constitutional objections is that it puts many eyes on the problem.
Congress has a responsibility to act only within its limited power under
the Constitution. Without constant attention to these limits, Congress is
likely to overrun them.181

177. For example, a representative may propose a bill to create a new regulatory body,
leaving the institutional details of that body to be determined through committee deliberation.
Some of those institutional details may raise constitutional questions. See Tushnet, supra note 9,
at 506 n.32 (suggesting the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as an example of this
form of constitutional problem).
178. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1308.
179. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 505 (―Sometimes constitutional issues lurk in the details
of a complex statute, and particularly in interactions among apparently unrelated provisions.
Even an astute parliamentarian might miss a fair number of non-trivial constitutional issues that
arise in these ways.‖).
180. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1304–05 (―[T]he congressional structure
for the consideration of constitutional questions should reflect a balance between the need to
improve legislative capacity to discharge Congress‘s responsibility in this area and the need to
enact legislation without undue delay or extreme difficulty . . . . [P]rocess can be used
strategically by those unconcerned with constitutional issues to derail bills that they oppose on
other grounds.‖).
181. See generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 805, 807–09 (2010) (arguing that in the absence of judicial review, members of Congress
ignore legal limits on institutional behavior).
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B. Majoritarian Reforms
Another drawback of the current CAS rule is that a CAS is the
statement of only a single member of Congress. Changes could be made
to the rule that would turn CASs into statements of the entire House of
Representatives or the entire Congress.
These proposals have certain advantages. They would require
Congress as an institution to take a constitutional position, rather than
simply requiring individual members to engage in some level of
deliberation. That institutional statement would probably be given
greater weight by the courts, even possibly increasing Congress‘s
influence over the meaning of the Constitution relative to the other
branches of government.
However, there are also serious drawbacks. Requiring majority
agreement is likely to lead to watered-down statements about the
Constitution, making the constitutional claims less specific in order to
create majority approval. Additionally, the level of agreement necessary
to accomplish a congressional statement about the Constitution is even
greater than the level of agreement necessary for the Supreme Court to
hold a statute constitutional. These concerns counsel against adopting
strong majoritarian CAS reforms.
Not all majoritarian reform proposals are necessarily bad, however.
The deliberation-increasing reforms discussed in the previous section
also speak to some majoritarian concerns. Though they do not create a
majority statement in favor of or against a CAS, they do draw a larger
number of lawmakers into the constitutional deliberation and decision
process.
1. Floor Votes for CASs
One possible reform would be to require a procedural vote on
adoption of a CAS immediately prior to voting on the text of a bill. To
account for any amendments to the bill‘s text that are made on the floor,
the CAS could be amendable on the floor and should not be voted on
until the bill text is set.182 If a bill is changed in conference committee,
the committee could also make any necessary changes to the CAS and
resubmit it for a vote along with the conference version of the bill. In
the strongest form of this rule, the CAS vote would not be waivable.
Procedural votes are often used as ―test votes‖ to measure support
for a bill, or as ways of blocking legislation before it comes to a
substantive vote. A vote on a bill‘s CAS might be used in these ways
182. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 505–06 (―Sometimes constitutional issues arise from
amendments proposed on the floor of the House or Senate, after the standard committee
processes have been completed.‖).
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also, with all the positives and negatives inherent in those
possibilities.183 It is also easy to imagine this procedural vote becoming
a mere formality, with nobody paying attention to the content of the
CAS even as they vote to adopt it.
A more troubling problem with requiring a majority vote on a CAS
is that people might agree that a bill is constitutional while disagreeing
about exactly why it is constitutional. One sees these disagreements in
courts all the time, with judges concurring in the judgment but
providing different reasons for their decisions. The problem is likely to
arise even more frequently in Congress because the membership of
Congress is so much larger than any court.
Disagreement about reasons for constitutionality can lead to absurd
results. Suppose that 40% of Representatives think that a certain bill is
authorized as a regulation of interstate commerce and is not a tax, 40%
think it is authorized as a tax and is not a regulation of commerce, and
20% think the bill is unconstitutional. If a majority must approve the
same CAS, the bill will not be able to pass, even though 80% of the
House believes it is constitutional.
One way of dealing with this problem would be to allow alternative
CASs. No single clause can gain majority support, and nobody wants to
vote for a CAS that endorses both clauses at the same time. Instead,
Congress could allow two or more CASs to be voted on in the
alternative, and as long as the votes in favor of the different options add
up to a majority,184 the bill can be passed.
Another possibility is to allow a bill to be enacted even if the
majority disapproves of the CAS. This resolves a split-opinion situation
like the one above without creating confusing procedural headaches.
However, it also allows Congress to be irresponsible about the
constitutionality of legislation. Congress could enact legislation that is
preferred on policy grounds even when a majority believes it to be
unconstitutional. It would not even have to be explicit about doing so,
since it could always claim that a majority-unconstitutionality situation
was actually a split-opinion one. Still, it forces members of Congress to
take a position on the constitutional question separate from their
position on the policy merits.185 It also exposes members to public
183. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 230 (2007) (offering a ―design
principle‖ that mechanisms to increase constitutional deliberation in Congress should not
―provid[e] opportunities for strategic action by coalitions seeking to derail bills that they oppose
on other grounds‖).
184. An individual representative may be allowed to vote for more than one CAS, for
example if she thinks that the bill is both a tax and a regulation of commerce, but she would
only count as a single vote toward the majority support for constitutionality.
185. Cf. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1330 (―We think a separate vote [on
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criticism, right or wrong, for voting to enact a bill while denying its
constitutionality. Courts could also factor the lack of a majority-adopted
CAS into their decision making.
2. CAS in Bill Text
The strongest way for Congress to make its constitutional views
binding and official is to put those views in the text of the bill.
Textualists and nontextualists agree that the content of the statute itself
is primary in statutory interpretation. It is a familiar aphorism that all
interpretation must begin with the text of the statute.
Nothing prevents Congress from putting statements about the
Constitution in a bill voluntarily, and it has done so from time to
time.186 This Subsection discusses the legal and practical issues
surrounding a rule requiring Congress to do this for every bill it enacts.
Such a rule has been proposed on numerous occasions,187 but it would
give rise to more problems than benefits.

waiving constitutional points of order], which disaggregates the lawmaker‘s stand on the
constitutional issue from her final vote and eliminates or reduces her ability to explain away a
troublesome position on the constitutional matter as a necessary evil to passing an omnibus bill
with numerous provisions that her constituents like, is sufficient protection.‖).
186. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb4
(2006), is a prominent example, but there are many others. The Trade Act of 1974, for example,
states that the fast track process for enacting trade legislation is ―an exercise of the rulemaking
power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively‖ and notes ―the
constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that
House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of
that House.‖ Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006). The Affordable Care Act also has a
provision addressing its own constitutionality. See Affordable Care Act § 1501(a)(3) (citing
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)).
187. Proposals for this kind of rule have been floated before, but none has been enacted.
Representative John Shadegg of Arizona introduced an Enumerated Powers Act in every
Congress from the 104th until his retirement after the 111th Congress. These bills would have
made a constitutional authority statement part of the text of all legislation. See H.R. 2270, 104th
Cong. (1995); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); Enumerated Powers Act,
H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 175, 107th Cong. (2001);
Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 2458,
109th Cong. (2005); Enumerated Powers Act, H.R. 1359, 110th Cong. (2007); Enumerated
Powers Act, H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Enumerated Powers Act, S. 3159, 110th
Cong. (2008) (introduced by Sen. Tom Coburn); Enumerated Powers Act, S. 1319, 111th Cong.
(2009) (same). One resolution, sponsored by Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey, would
have not only required a CAS in bill text, but banned reliance on the Common Defense Clause,
General Welfare Clause, or Necessary and Proper Clause as a stand-alone authority. See H.R.
Res. 1754, 111th Cong. (2010).
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a. Implementation
The first question is what form such a rule could take. Congress
might try to implement it through a chamber rule, just like the current
CAS rule and the two prior possibilities discussed. The rule would be
implemented most smoothly if both the House and Senate adopted the
same requirement, but even adopting the rule in a single house could
work. If the House had a strong, nonwaivable requirement that the text
of each bill include a CAS, and the Senate did not, then the House
would have to amend any bill originating in the Senate to insert one.188
But it is unclear whether a chamber rule can dictate what must appear in
the text of a bill.
Another possibility is to enact a statute requiring a CAS to be
included in every bill.189 There is some precedent for this type of
requirement. Title One of the U.S. Code places certain requirements on
the form and text of laws. Title One U.S.C. § 101 states: ―The enacting
clause of all Acts of Congress shall be in the following form: ‗Be it
enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,‘‖190 and § 103 dictates that these
words should be used only in the first section of an Act.191 However, it
is unclear whether the courts would be willing to strike down a statute
that did not have the proper enacting clause. No court has struck down a
federal statute on the grounds of an absent enacting clause, but this is at
least in part due to the fact that no statute has been challenged seriously
on this ground.192 Many states have a constitutional enacting clause
requirement, and state courts have invalidated legislation that lacks the
required clause.193
Even if § 101 is valid and binding, it is not completely analogous to
a statutory CAS requirement. The enacting clause is purely formalistic
and formulaic. It requires precise words that are identical for every
188. In a weaker version of this rule, the House might only require a CAS for bills
originating in the House.
189. See generally Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules:
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345,
349–51 (2003) (discussion of the validity of statutes that dictate chamber rules).
190. 1 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
191. Id. § 103 (―No enacting or resolving words shall be used in any section of an Act or
resolution of Congress except in the first.‖).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Laroche, 170 Fed. App‘x 124 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that
defendant did not prove enacting clause was absent); United States v. Petersen, 2009 WL
3062013, at *8 n.9 (D. Minn. 2009) (slip copy) (holding that enacting clauses need not be
codified in the U.S. Code because 1 U.S.C. § 101 applies only to original Acts); United States v.
Ramanauskas, 2005 WL 189708, at *5 n.1 (D. Minn. 2005) (same).
193. See, e.g., People v. Dettenthaler, 77 N.W. 450, 453 (Mich. 1898) (concluding that law
was invalid because enacting clause was inserted by clerk after it was passed).
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statute passed by Congress. A CAS requirement would be more
substantive and more variable, because different statutes draw authority
from different parts of the Constitution. The statute would require
substantive, individualized content to be included in each bill that
becomes law, and would purport to prevent bills from becoming
effective law without that content.
A stronger analogy is an express reference provision. Congress has
attempted to protect certain statutes from being repealed by implication
in later statutes. To accomplish this, Congress included a provision in
the protected statute announcing that any repeal of the statute must
reference it specifically by name or section number.194
Many scholars and judges take a skeptical view of Congress‘s ability
to bind future Congresses through statutes.195 Thus, even if Congress
were to pass a statute requiring CASs in all future statutes, it would be
questionable whether the requirement was truly binding. Suppose there
was a statutory CAS requirement, and Congress subsequently passed a
statute that, intentionally or unintentionally, did not include a CAS. The
second statute complied with all of the constitutional Article I, Section 7
requirements for enacting laws, and was otherwise perfectly
constitutional. Would that statute nonetheless be invalid because it did
not include the CAS content? Or would the second statute be viewed as
an implied repeal (or partial amendment) of the first one? A full
exploration of these questions is well beyond the scope of this Article. I
raise the issue here only to point out that one problem with a statutory
CAS requirement is that despite taking the form of a statute, it may turn
out to not be actually binding on Congress.196
Nevertheless, a statute requiring a CAS in all subsequent statutes
could be beneficial in the way the enacting clause statute is: it provides
an entrenched standard format that can be easily followed.
Congressional compliance with the enacting clause requirement is so
universal that there has never been an opportunity to seriously challenge
it. Compliance with express reference requirements has been somewhat
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2006) (―No other provision of law, enacted before, on,
or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions
of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.‖).
195. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 144–45 (2005) (holding that the
phrase ―[n]otwithstanding any other provision of statute,‖ satisfies an express reference
requirement despite the lack of any specific mention of the statute being repealed); id. at 147–50
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that express reference provisions are invalid because each new
Congress has ―the power to make its will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate—
including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly contradicting them‖);
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 165, at 99–100.
196. See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra note 165, at 107 (arguing that Congress
cannot bind future Congresses).
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lacking, partially due to the political benefits of repealing a popular
statute without mentioning it and partially due to the difficulty of
understanding all of the effects a new statute may have on prior laws.197
On this dimension of comparison, a CAS requirement is more similar to
the enacting clause requirement. It is a pro forma statement that would
be required in every bill and need not refer to complex existing law. The
enforceability of the CAS requirement is not relevant if Congress
chooses to voluntarily comply, and there is every reason to think
Congress largely would.
b. The Problem of the President
Further questions arise after resolving how to implement the rule.
All of the problems discussed above, in the section about requiring
adoption of CASs by a procedural vote,198 apply equally if not more
strongly when the CAS is put in the text of a bill. Additionally, the
House and Senate will have to agree on the CAS in order to pass the
bill.
A more problematic possibility is that the President may not agree
with the CAS. The President‘s institutional position as head of the
Executive Branch naturally leads him to take different constitutional
views than Congress on some issues. A tumultuous history of interbranch conflict attests to the likelihood of these disagreements. From
the Bank of the United States, to military commissions for trying
suspected terrorists, to the ban on using torture in interrogation, to the
legislative veto, to the Defense of Marriage Act, presidents have
frequently disagreed with Congress‘s constitutional decisions. The
President will sometimes respond to this disagreement by vetoing
legislation that he believes is unconstitutional. In recent decades,
signing statements have become a prominent way for a president to sign
legislation while simultaneously objecting to unconstitutional
provisions or applications.199
As an example of things the President might object to because of his
institutional position, consider the CAS that was attached to the
Restoring Essential Constitutional Constraints for Libyan Action
Involving the Military Act:

197. See Volokh, supra note 68, at 141–42 (discussing the difficulties inherent in analyzing
the effects of legislation ex ante).
198. See supra Subsection IV.B.1.
199. See Christopher S. Kelley, The Law Contextualizing the Signing Statement, 37
PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 737, 739–43 (2007) (recounting the development of the modern signing
statement).
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Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution states
that Congress shall have the power ―To declare War,‖ ―To
raise and support Armies,‖ ―To provide and maintain a
Navy,‖ and ―To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.‖ Although the
Constitution‘s Article II, Section 2 designates the President
as ―Commander in Chief,‖ that title does not empower the
President to order congressionally unauthorized force when
the United States has not been attacked or is not in
imminent danger of attack. This bill reclaims Congress‘s
core constitutional prerogative to control when offensive
military force is used.200
This is a view of the separation of war powers that is largely
supported by scholars in the field, but it has been repeatedly challenged
by other scholars and by the Executive Branch itself. A majority of
Congress is likely to favor a CAS like this, but any President can be
expected to disagree.
If a CAS is included in the text of a bill, will the President‘s
signature be read as an agreement with that CAS? Presumably it will,
unless the President makes a statement objecting to the CAS. There are
two different situations in which a President might disagree with a bill‘s
CAS. First, he might think that the bill is wholly or partially
unconstitutional. Second, he might think that the bill is constitutional,
but is justified under a different clause than the one(s) cited by
Congress.
If a bill is entirely unconstitutional on its face, the President is
obligated to veto it.201 But if the bill is unconstitutional only in part or in
some applications, a President will often choose to sign it into law
anyway.202 When a President chooses to sign a bill he believes is
200. 157 Cong. Rec. H2037–38 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2011) (Constitutional Authority
Statement for H.R. 1212 introduced by Representative Amash).
201. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 81 n.4 (2007) (―[I]f a bill is unconstitutional in all of its
applications, the President must veto the underlying bill.‖).
202. This has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. See William Baude, Signing
Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 304–05 (2011) (arguing that many bills have portions
that are constitutionally required alongside portions that are unconstitutional, and that the
President may sign such a bill); Prakash, supra note 201, at 81–82 (arguing that the President is
obligated to veto a bill that has any unconstitutional part); Michael B. Rappaport, The
Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113, 120–24
(2007) (arguing that if the President believes a provision of a bill should not be enforced
because it is unconstitutional, the President must veto that bill); Michael B. Rappaport, The
President‟s Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 771–76 (1993) (arguing that the
President violates the Constitution when signing an unconstitutional bill into law).
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partially unconstitutional, there is a risk that he will be misunderstood
as believing that the bill is completely constitutional. This
misunderstanding can be problematic, because the Supreme Court often
gives some amount of deference to the combined judgment of Congress
and the President about constitutionality. Thus, it is important for the
President to make his constitutional views known when they differ from
Congress‘s.
Signing statements can accomplish this to some extent. However,
judges have never given signing statements much weight in statutory
interpretation,203 despite the intent of the Office of Legal Counsel to
promote signing statements as a counterweight to legislative history,204
and the views of some scholars that they should be taken seriously.205
The President is generally seen as being outside the legislative
process,206 even though he has a significant constitutional and practical
role in crafting and enacting legislation.207 Additionally, signing
statements have been condemned as post-enactment legislative history,
one of the least favored types of legislative history. 208
203. See Nicholas J. Leddy, Note, Determining Due Deference: Examining When Courts
Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 871–72
(2007) (―When federal courts refer to signing statements, they often cite to them as a minor
piece of legislative history or use them as one factor in analyzing a particular statute. Rarely, if
ever, do courts use the signing statement‘s interpretation of legislation as controlling.‖).
204. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel to the Litig. Strategy Working Grp., Using Presidential Signing Statement to
Make Fuller Use of the President‟s Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting
Law, (Feb. 5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf (advocating the use of
signing statements as a way to increase Executive Branch influence over statutory
interpretation).
205. Compare Paul T. Stepnowsky, Note, Deference to Presidential Signing Statements in
Administrative Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1086, 1098–1100 (2010) (arguing that signing
statements should receive Skidmore deference), with Leddy, supra note 203, at 882–84 (arguing
against deference to agencies that rely heavily on signing statements in their decision-making).
206. See generally Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 363, 365–68 (1987) (objecting to signing statements largely on separation of powers
grounds).
207. See Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 4 (2002) (arguing that the Recommendation Clause, the State of the Union requirement,
and the veto power give the President a significant legislative role).
208. See Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 597, 606–08 (2006) (arguing that judges should not give much weight to signing
statements in statutory interpretation). But see Laura McDonald, Note, The Interpretive Worth of
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Form of Legislative History, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
179, 193–202 (2010) (taking a more favorable approach to signing statements as legislative
history useful for judicial interpretation).
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Signing statements are thus disfavored in comparison with
legislative history. They are likely to be even more disfavored in
comparison with constitutional statements that appear in the enacted bill
text itself. And rightly so—statements that are approved through the
constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment have legal
authority, whereas the statements of a single branch of government are
simply opinions.
Including CASs in the text of legislation, therefore, would increase
Congress‘s influence over constitutional interpretation relative to the
President. Of course, the President might be able to exert influence over
the CAS during the process of negotiation over the pending bill.
However, it would be surprising if the President put more emphasis on
the CAS than on the substantive content of the bill, which is likely to
have a larger practical effect, particularly in the short term. The
President is unlikely to use his limited bargaining power to change a
CAS rather than to change substantive content that he objects to.
c. Costs and Benefits of a Statutory CAS
The major benefit of including a CAS in statutory text is that it
becomes law. If Congress wants its statements about the Constitution to
be as legal and binding as possible, putting them in statutory text is the
way to accomplish that. However, the costs of putting CASs in statutory
text are substantial, and probably outweigh the benefits.
First, a statutory CAS demands too much agreement. A majority of
the House and a majority of the Senate must agree on the same
constitutional authority for each bill, and then the President must agree
when signing the bill into law (alternatively, two-thirds of each house
could agree to pass it over the President‘s veto). But, as discussed
above,209 there is no reason to demand that everyone agree on precisely
why a statute is constitutional. Judges routinely concur in the same
judgment with different constitutional reasoning. There is no good
reason to demand majority agreement in Congress, or agreement
between Congress and the President, about what the precise
constitutional authority for any given statute is. It is enough that they
agree that some part of the Constitution authorizes the statute.
Second, requiring majority agreement on a CAS may actually
dampen constitutional discussion instead of enhancing it. The truly
important result of CASs is discussion about the Constitution, not
agreement about the Constitution. That discussion gives life to our
democratic process of constitutional government. Members of Congress

209. See supra Section IV.B.
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should be thinking actively about the Constitution while they do their
jobs.
When Congress knows that it must reach agreement on a
constitutional question in order to enact legislation that it desires on the
merits, it is likely to adopt a general, non-controversial CAS. Instead of
choosing a particular clause, Congress may choose to repeatedly cite
Article I, Section 8, the source of most of the specific grants of
congressional authority. Nobody who supports the legislation on its
merits will have incentive to object, because disagreement on the CAS
could derail passage of the desired legislation.
In contrast, if a CAS is only a legislative history statement and
majority agreement is not required, a thousand flowers can bloom.
There is no harm in a member of Congress coming to the floor to state,
―The CAS for this bill says it‘s a regulation of interstate commerce. I
don‘t believe the Commerce Clause stretches so far. I believe this bill is
a tax, and it is justified under the congressional power to lay and collect
taxes for the general welfare.‖
Finally, courts might see statutory CASs as an affront to their own
interpretive authority. If CASs are only in legislative history, the courts
might use them or ignore them as they see fit. But if CASs are in
statutory text, purporting to be binding on courts, the courts might begin
to feel a bit defensive. Courts have frowned upon congressional
disagreement with judicial constitutional interpretation in the past.210
Congress could easily weaken its own position by pushing a
confrontation with the Supreme Court on this issue. A better strategy for
Congress is to build up its credibility as a constitutional interpreter by
actively debating the Constitution during its own legislative
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
This Article answered only a few of the many interesting questions
raised by constitutional authority statements. The existence of CASs
gives scholars, the public, and the courts a window into how members
of Congress think about the Constitution. This window should not be
closed; it should be opened further. Scholars should examine the content
and effects of CASs. The House of Representatives should retain this

210. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997) (striking down a statute
that attempted to impose Congress‘s own constitutional interpretation instead of the Supreme
Court‘s prior interpretation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958) (declaring that the
Supreme Court is the supreme interpreter of the Constitution); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in
Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 82–83 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (1995).
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rule in future sessions, preferably with some of the modifications
suggested here. The Senate would do well to adopt a similar rule.
Constitutional authority statements are a form of constitutional
interpretation outside the courts. Almost all commentators agree
Congress has a responsibility to pay attention to the constitutionality of
its enactments, though they disagree on whether Congress should
analyze the Constitution for itself or heed the judgments of the Supreme
Court. Under either definition, constitutional authority statements are a
tool for ensuring the constitutionality of legislation.
CASs are primarily useful for Congress itself, in its internal
deliberations. While the courts may choose to look at them to a certain
extent, they are a decidedly weak form of legislative history, coming at
the beginning of the legislative process and approved by only a single
member. These features make them less useful for judicial
interpretation, but much more useful for kickstarting deliberations
within Congress. Having a statement of constitutionality available at the
outset of discussions over a policy proposal reminds members that they
should consider whether they agree or disagree with that statement.
When a bill does present constitutional problems, members should be
less likely to ignore it when a constitutional authority statement is
presented to them before discussions begin.
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